

**GENERALS BETWEEN POWERS: A ROUTINE OF “INDISCIPLINE”, “CRISES”
AND “INSUBORDINATION” (2007-2018)**

***GENERAIS ENTRE PODERES: UMA ROTINA DE “INDISCIPLINA”, “CRISES” E
“INSUBORDINAÇÃO” (2007-2018)***


***GENERALES ENTRE PODERES: UNA RUTINA DE “INDISCIPLINA”, “CRISIS” E
“INSUBORDINACIÓN” (2007-2018)***



Guilherme Alessandro Lemos da Silva MOREIRA¹
e-mail: guilhermemoreira@estudante.ufscar.br

How to reference this article:

MOREIRA, G. A. L. S. Generals between Powers: A routine of "indiscipline," "crises", and "insubordination" (2007-2018). **Teoria & Pesquisa: Revista de Ciência Política**, São Carlos, v. 32, n. esp. 2, e023017, 2023. e-ISSN: 2236-0107. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.14244/tp.v32iesp.2.985>



| **Submitted:** 08/05/2023
| **Revisions required:** 29/08/2023
| **Approved:** 19/10/2023
| **Published:** 05/12/2023

Editor: Prof. Dr. Simone Diniz
Deputy Executive Editor: Prof. Dr. José Anderson Santos Cruz

¹ Federal University of São Carlos (UFSCar), São Carlos – SP – Brazil. Master's student in the Graduate Program in Social Anthropology (PPGAS/UFSCar).

ABSTRACT: In the 2018 elections, the meaningful presence of generals from the Brazilian Army elected to the Congress or becoming Ministers of State has been observed in the Brazilian scenario. This article addresses the military careers of four generals: Antonio Hamilton Martins Mourão, Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, Maynard Marques de Santa Rosa, and Eliéser Girão Monteiro Filho. From a systematic analysis of reportages from the newspapers O Globo, Folha de S. Paulo, and O Estado de S. Paulo between September 2017 and November 2018 it has been analyzed the notions of “crises”, “indiscipline,” and “insubordination” often used to describe the procedure of these generals during previous governments. In the end, we have observed how these officers acted as spokespersons for the Army, in constant media exposure that concretized their military capabilities in political power and authority while the military institution passed the perception of “punishment” for their declarations.

KEYWORDS: Brazilian Army. Military Policy. Crises. Indiscipline. Newspapers.

RESUMO: Com as eleições de 2018, observou-se no cenário brasileiro a presença significativa de generais do Exército Brasileiro eleitos para o Congresso ou tornando-se ministros de Estado. Neste artigo tratou-se da carreira militar de quatro desses generais: Antonio Hamilton Martins Mourão, Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, Maynard Marques de Santa Rosa e Eliéser Girão Monteiro Filho. A partir de uma análise sistemática de reportagens dos jornais O Globo, Folha de S. Paulo e O Estado de S. Paulo entre setembro de 2007 e novembro de 2018, analisaram-se as noções de “crise”, “indisciplina” e “insubordinação” frequentemente utilizadas para descrever a atuação desses generais durante governos anteriores. Ao final, foi observado como estes oficiais atuaram enquanto porta-vozes do Exército, em uma continuada exposição midiática que consubstanciou suas capacidades militares em poder e autoridade política, ao mesmo tempo, em que a instituição militar passava a percepção de “punição” por suas declarações.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Exército Brasileiro. Política Militar. Crise. Indisciplina. Jornais.

RESUMEN: Con las elecciones de 2018, se ha observado en el escenario brasileño la presencia significativa de generales del Ejército Brasileño electos para el Congreso o se convirtiendo en ministros de Estado. En este artículo abordamos la carrera militar de cuatro de estos generales: Antonio Hamilton Martins Mourão, Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, Maynard Marques de Santa Rosa y Eliéser Girão Monteiro Filho. Desde un análisis sistemático de reportajes de los periódicos O Globo, Folha de S. Paulo y O Estado de S. Paulo entre septiembre de 2007 y noviembre de 2018 se analizó las nociones de “crisis”, “indisciplina” e “insubordinación” recurrentemente utilizadas para describir la actuación de esos generales durante gobiernos anteriores. Al final, observamos como estos oficiales actuaron como portavoces del Ejército, en una constante exposición mediática que concretizó sus capacidades militares en poder y autoridad política mientras que la institución militar pasaba la percepción de “punición” por sus declaraciones.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Ejército Brasileño. Política Militar. Crisis. Indisciplina. Periódicos.

Introduction

There have been many efforts to understand why the Armed Forces, theoretically distanced from political power since the end of the Military Regime (MARTINS FILHO, 2010), have become, in recent years, one of the institutions with the greatest representation in the composition of positions in the Federal Executive, especially after the electoral victory of the presidential ticket led by Captain Jair Bolsonaro and Army General Antônio Hamilton Martins Mourão². Even during the campaign and after the ministerial appointment of a considerable number of officers, particularly from the Brazilian Army, much attention was focused on the careers that these military personnel had pursued within the Armed Forces up to that point.

If, in the initial phase, military careers were used as an electoral and governmental strategy to distinguish these actors, emphasizing the formulation of “technical competence” in filling positions, a second phase saw some academic works³ and journalistic reports⁴ pointing to a scenario in which a series of military personnel who had played key roles in disputes with the Workers’ Party governments over the past two decades, and even with the government of Michel Temer, were appointed. These reports frequently mentioned Generals Antônio Hamilton Martins Mourão, Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, and Maynard Marques de Santa Rosa.

In this context, and based on a systematic analysis of news reports published in the newspapers *O Globo*, *Folha de S. Paulo*, and *O Estado de S. Paulo* between September 2007 and November 2018⁵, this study will problematize the notions of “indiscipline”, “crisis”, and “insubordination” often used to analyze the military careers of these generals. In the first section, we will see how these notions, besides not arising from military *culture*⁶ to to

² For example, Leirner (2020); Martins Filho (2021); Cortinhas and Vitelli (2021); Vitelli (2021); Oliveira (2021a; 2021b); and Oliveira e Kalil (2021).

³ For example, Martins Filho (2019).

⁴ For example, Fernandes (2018); Ferraz e Xavier (2018); Vitor (2018a; 2018b).

⁵ Keyword searches were conducted in the digital archives of the three newspapers, focusing on nominal mentions of the four generals discussed in this article. The *O Globo* archive can be accessed at: <https://acervo.oglobo.globo.com/>; *Folha de S. Paulo* at: <https://acervo.folha.com.br/index.do>; and *O Estado de S. Paulo* at: <https://acervo.estadao.com.br/>. In the latter archive, it is possible to collect either the “edição Brasil” or the “edição São Paulo”. In our case, we preferred to collect the articles from the latter, as the newspaper itself indicates that this would be the edition completed “later,” meaning the one in which “[...] the Editorial team has more time to complete the edition, allowing for further refinement of the news”. Accessed on: 30 Jan. 2023.

⁶ The term “culture” is used here in the sense of Roy Wagner as a “[...] basis of communication in shared conventions”, that is, the sharing of symbolic elements (words, images, gestures, etc.) and their respective associations by a relative number of people, making it possible to orient human experience and understanding. In our case, the use of the Wagnerian concept also seeks to highlight the inventive (creative) nature of culture, which, when endowed with “creative ambiguity”, constantly invents “marked” versions of itself, thus extending the range of conventional associations of its own symbolic elements (WAGNER, 2010 [1975/1981], p. 54-85, our translation).

understand events that occur within it, became an important tool through which the military institution began to disguise its political activities through media exposure, with a focus on issues related to the military's role in the Amazon, especially in the continuous demarcation of indigenous lands and the border strip. In these cases, the process occurred primarily through spokespersons who acted in a disciplined and hierarchical manner, in a game that included the manipulation of internal rules regarding the movement of Brazilian Army general officers, creating situations of false punishment in the eyes of the "civil" perception⁷.

In the second section, we will highlight how, once the pattern of disputes with "civilian" governments was established, it was replicated in the careers of other generals. Thus, following a policy of media exposure carried out by the Army Commander, we will demonstrate how military capabilities became political power and authority (LEIRNER, 2020), which began to be used for electoral purposes by other members of the chain of command.

Finally, in light of the presented data, the text engages with recent studies that have characterized such political activity through the constitution of an informal political party, the so-called Military Party. It will be demonstrated how, beyond corporate agendas, this organization fits into a complex context of the dissolution of democracy, as well as the emergence of figures characterized as populists, while preserving its objectives of taming society and the State as a whole.

The "Amazon Issue"

During the two terms of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's presidency (2003-2010), there were many moments considered "political crises" involving the Armed Forces (OLIVEIRA, 2009; MARTINS FILHO, 2010). In this section, we will focus on those involving the demarcation of the Raposa Serra do Sol Indigenous Land (TIRSS) and the publication of the first edition of the National Defense Strategy (END) and the third edition of the National Human Rights Plan, with special attention to the careers of Generals Santa Rosa, Ribeiro Pereira, and Girão Monteiro Filho⁸.

⁷ The term "civil" is placed in quotation marks because we understand, along with Lauriani Albertini (2009), that this term is, in itself, an "invention" by the military, marking the boundary between the "outside" and the "inside" of military institutions.

⁸ It was decided to include General Girão Monteiro in the analysis due to his prominent role in the discourse surrounding the demarcation of the TIRSS in 2008. Additionally, he was elected as a federal deputy for Rio Grande do Norte for the PSL party in 2018, the same party as Jair Bolsonaro.

Raposa Serra do Sol Indigenous Land

The interest of the Brazilian Army in the demarcation of the Raposa Serra do Sol Indigenous Land (TIRSS) in the northeastern state of Roraima is part of the doctrinal-strategic and symbolic context envisioned by that institution for the Brazilian Amazon since the early 1990s, a period that marked the transfer of Infantry Brigades from the South and Southeast of the country to the region (Marques, 2007), officially consecrated by the publication of the first National Defense Policy in 1996, which, in its objectives, emphasized the need for the "valorization of military presence"⁹ in the Amazon (BRASIL, 1996, p. 6-10).

In this context, the Amazon quickly became a priority area for National Defense since, according to the doctrinal-strategic reorientation of the Army in the post-Cold War period of the 1990s, central countries, especially the United States, now free from ideological constraints that guided their military actions, would use humanitarian and ecological issues, such as the *protection of the Amazon* and *indigenous populations*, to camouflage their interests in the natural and mineral riches of the region and the consequent *internationalization of the Amazon* (LEIRNER, 1995; MARTINS FILHO; ZIRKER, 2000; MARTINS FILHO, 2002; MARQUES, 2007; LOURENÇÃO, 2007).

Furthermore, beyond the geopolitical aspects involved in the military interest in the Amazon¹⁰, research has already pointed to the need to understand the symbolic elements specifically related to this reorientation¹¹. These studies indicate that symbolic changes were also made: as two previously important commemorations, the victory over the "Communist Uprising" in 1935 and the "Revolution" of March 31, 1964, lost their significance, celebrations related to the First Battle of Guararapes (April 19, 1648) gained prominence. Since 1994, at the initiative of the then Minister of the Army, General Zenildo Zoroastro de Lucena, this battle became the date for the celebration of Army Day (CASTRO, 2002, 2004; CASTRO; SOUZA, 2012).

⁹ This objective will be reiterated and supplemented by the need to develop and revitalize the border area in the update of the 2005 National Defense Policy (PDN). Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2005/decreto/d5484.htm. Accessed on: 9 July 2021.

¹⁰ Highlighted in the works of João Roberto Martins Filho (2001, 2002, 2010), João Roberto Martins Filho and Daniel Zirker (2000), Humberto Lourenção (2007), Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira (2009), Érica Winand and Héctor Luis Saint-Pierre (2010), and Luís Alexandre Fuccille (2015),

¹¹ Including Piero Leirner (1995, 1997, 2012, 2020), Celso Castro (2004 [1990], 2002), Castro and Adriana Barreto de Souza (2012), and Adriana Aparecida Marques (2007).

Not by chance, the implicit message in the recent *invention*¹² of the Guararapes tradition would be its association with the Amazon (CASTRO, 2002). Both in the Battle episode and in present times, the Army would observe *international covetousness*, the result of actors better equipped and in greater numbers than the “national forces”, who would act through guerrilla tactics focused on the concealment of their real interests (CASTRO; SOUZA, 2012; MARQUES, 2007). Thus, through an *invention*, an attempt is made to link representations of distinct spaces and times (CASTRO; SOUZA, 2012, p. 228), in order to produce continuity between them, which becomes, in the end, the “evidence” of the institution's continuity throughout history in the eyes of the military themselves (LEIRNER, 1997, p. 130).

It is precisely in this scenario of progressive “Amazônia, volver” by the Army (Matos, 2010, p. 145) that the participation of the Armed Forces in the demarcation of TIRSS takes place. This participation began in 2002 when the 6th Special Frontier Platoon of Uiramutã was installed, a municipality created in 1995 by the government of Roraima through State Law No. 98, together with the municipality of Pacaraima. At that time, both municipal territories were already included as indigenous lands since 1993, the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) recognized them as part of the 1,678,800 hectares to be demarcated continuously (SILVA, 2012, p. 113-114)¹³.

On October 7, 2002, five months after the creation of the Platoon, Decree No. 4,412 was promulgated by then-President of the Republic, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The decree established that within “traditionally occupied indigenous lands”, the Armed Forces (AF) and the Federal Police (FP) were guaranteed “freedom of movement”, the possibility of “installing and maintaining military and police units”, and “the implementation of programs and projects for border control and protection”¹⁴.

The permission for “free transit and access” by the AF was reiterated by Ordinance No. 534 of April 13, 2005, from the Ministry of Justice, which was used as a basis for the

¹² Castro (2002) derives the term from the concept of “invented tradition” by Eric Hobsbawm (1997), in which the author seeks to emphasize that such traditions “[...] aim to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior through repetition which implies, automatically, continuity with the past”, and are used in the face of broad and rapid changes in the modern world (HOBBSAWM, 1997, p. 09-10, our translation). The way we use it is similar to Castro’s, precisely because it also relates to Roy Wagner’s formulation of *invention*, understood as a general and ongoing process of human culture, which can occur in response to the “transformations” of the modern world, but not necessarily dependent on them.

¹³ Not coincidentally, the creation of municipalities within indigenous areas aimed precisely at preventing their demarcation (SANTILLI, 2001, p. 122, cited in SILVA, 2012, p. 114), since later both the municipalities and the Army Platoon would be used as justifications for the demarcation of the TIRSS in the form of islands.

¹⁴ Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2002/d4412.htm. Accessed on: 7 July 2021.

demarcation decree of TIRSS signed two days later by then-President Lula¹⁵. According to the decree, in Article 4, it was ensured that “[...] the action of the Armed Forces, for the defense of national territory and sovereignty, and of the Federal Police Department of the Ministry of Justice, to guarantee security and public order and protect constitutional indigenous rights, in the Raposa Serra do Sol Indigenous Land”¹⁶.

However, once demarcated, the removal of the non-indigenous population living within the TI had to be carried out within a maximum of one year, i.e., by April 2006¹⁷. However, this deadline was only considered exhausted by FUNAI in April 2007, due to a series of actions filed in the Federal Supreme Court (STF) contesting the demarcation and requesting guarantees for the non-indigenous population to remain within the TI until the STF decided on such actions, which only happened in June when the court allowed FUNAI to begin the removal (SILVA, 2012, p. 137).

The process of removing non-indigenous people extended until September of that year when the Federal Police, responsible for the operation, requested logistical support from the Ministry of Defense (MD). The idea was for the Air Force and the Army to assist the more than 500 Federal Police agents in entering the reserve and providing support for the operation. However, General Maynard Marques de Santa Rosa, then Secretary of Policy, Strategy, and International Affairs of the Ministry of Defense, twice stated – once in an interview with O Globo newspaper and once in a public hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defense of the Chamber of Deputies – not only the resistance of the Armed Forces to support the operation but also to the demarcation of TIRSS itself (ÉBOLI, 2007a; 2007b).

As a result of both statements, Santa Rosa was dismissed from his position at the MD. On that occasion, General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, who had been in charge of the Amazon Military Command (CMA) for two weeks, stated that his resources were “extremely limited” if he needed to provide support to the Federal Police, and he also commented on the dismissal of his colleague: “I deeply respect his position (on *Raposa Serra do Sol*) because I know him well. He has been studying the subject for a long time. He is knowledgeable about the área” (ÉBOLI, 2007b).

¹⁵ Demarcated with an extension of 1,747,464 hectares, comprising the municipalities of Normandia, Pacaraima, and Uiramutã; and inhabited by the Ingarikó, Makuxi, Patamona, Taurepang, and Wapixana peoples (INSTITUTO SOCIOAMBIENTAL, 2011, p. 250).

¹⁶ Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2005/dnn/Dnn10495.htm. Accessed on: 7 July 2021.

¹⁷ As stated in Ordinance No. 534 of April 13, 2005, by the Minister of Justice. Available at: http://www.pickupau.org.br/mundo/raposa_serra_do_sol/raposa_serra_sol_portaria_20534.pdf. Accessed on: 8 July 2022.

The statement about Santa Rosa would be the preamble to four other statements by General Heleno about TIRSS (MONTEIRO, 2007; GOIS, 2008; CARVALHO, 2008a; O ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO, 2008), which would climax with a lecture he gave at the Clube Militar in Rio de Janeiro on April 16, 2008. On that occasion, to an audience of both retired and active-duty military personnel (TABAK; MENEZES, 2008; MONTEIRO; NOGUEIRA; PARAGUASSÚ, 2008, our translation), he declared:

[...] I am completely in favor of the indigenous people because [...] I am not part of the Scottish left, who, behind a glass of 12-year-old whiskey, sitting on Avenida Atlântida, solves all of Brazil's problems. I am not the Scottish left; I am here [in the Amazon], I have visited more than 15 indigenous communities, I am seeing the indigenous people's problems [...]

I have no doubt that the biggest problem in the Amazon today is the indigenous issue. [...] Brazilian indigenous policy is completely disconnected from our country's historical colonization process, and it needs to be urgently reviewed. I am not against the agencies that handle this [FUNAI], **I want to work together to review a policy that, as demonstrated on the ground, has not worked until today; you just have to go there and look at the indigenous communities to see that this policy is regrettable, to say the least, it's chaotic. It's regrettable!**

[...] This indigenous policy must be modified!

[...] I have received many visits in the Amazon, and I have noticed that many people who have decisions regarding the Amazon in their hands are unfamiliar with the area. Often, when they come to visit us, it's the first time they have flown over the Amazon, and they have decisions that concern the Amazon. So the first major concern is that those who are deciding on the Amazon come to know us, understand the reality of the Amazon on the ground, not behind a desk because then all the problems look very different in reality.

[...] Despite being totally responsible for everything I said, **I tried to express the idea, opinion, and position of the High Command of the Army**, which is an organization that serves the Brazilian state and not the government (emphasis mine, our translation)¹⁸

From then on, the general would be, for journalists, "civil" authorities, and for himself – as evidenced by his lectures in his retired capacity¹⁹ – the officer whose “brand” would refer to criticism of the Lula government's indigenous policy, seen as “regrettable” and “chaotic”.

Although journalists and “civil” authorities attempted to characterize these statements by General Heleno as being aligned with the “old hardline” of the dictatorship (FREITAS, 2008), or as opinions that were not shared by all in the Armed Forces (ANGELO, 2008), the general perception, reiterated by other active-duty and retired military personnel, was that Heleno, authorized to give the lecture by the Army commander, was verbalizing the thoughts

¹⁸ See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q3ZyNbnRmWI> Accessed on: 14 June 2021.

¹⁹ See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QjYZXeYhKFc&t=4666s>. Accessed on: 8 July 2022.

of his peers and the institution itself regarding the *Amazon issue*, particularly concerning indigenous land demarcations²⁰.

Despite constituting, in theory, an episode of disciplinary transgression²¹, no punishment was imposed on the general, even though attempts were made to attribute an act of “censorship” by the Lula government to him (MONTEIRO, 2008). The matter was resolved in a brief meeting between Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, Heleno, and Enzo Martins Peri, who was then the Army commander. After the meeting, Jobim conveyed the general's justifications to President Lula, who considered the episode closed (CARVALHO, 2008b). Heleno would remain in charge of the CMA until April 2009 when he was transferred to the Department of Science and Technology of the Army, an event speculated as a kind of “demotion” or “punishment”, which does not seem to have been exactly the case, as will be seen below.

Up to this point, only General Santa Rosa had, to some extent, been “punished” by the Lula government through his dismissal from office – a procedure that is not listed among the punishments provided for in the Army Disciplinary Regulations²². However, a report by Jobim is revealing of how these two episodes were internally handled differently:

It was a four-star general on active duty who was at the Ministry of Defense [referring to General Maynard Santa Rosa] [...]. He made a statement there, and it came out... I remember waking up in the morning, opening the newspaper, and there was the statement from this... it was something... I think it was indigenous land. I don't remember what it was anymore, but it was something... criticizing the government's decisions. So, I woke up, and saw that, it was seven in the morning, I called Enzo, “Enzo, let's remove this guy.” Because those positions were all, at the time, under the president of the Republic. “Oh! What happened?”. I said: “Look, Enzo, get everything ready. I'm going to talk to the president, he's going to be removed. “And you tell me where he's going. I'm going to dismiss him from this position.” Then Enzo said, “Alright. Alright.” “Tell him.” “Alright, Minister, that's correct.” So I went to the Palace. When I was at the Palace, Lula came in, furious. “What is this, Jobim?!” I said, “No, it's nothing. You can sign it.” “What is this?”. “It's the act of removing the guy.” “What? Are you going to remove him?”. “Yes,

²⁰ These are the cases of Generals Luiz Cesário da Silveira Filho, Mário Mateus Madureira, Leônidas Pires Gonçalves (TABAK; MENEZES MENEZES, 2008), Paulo Cesar Castro (O GLOBO, 2008a), Eliéser Girão Monteiro Filho (ÉBOLI, 2008a, 2008b), Jarbas Passarinho (CARVALHO; BERLINCK, 2008), Gilberto de Figueiredo (FOLHA DE S. PAULO, 2008), and Admiral Marcos Martins Torres (MONTEIRO, 2008).

²¹ According to article 77, section 1(a) of the Statute of Military Personnel: “The use of uniforms in political party-related manifestations is prohibited.” since Heleno was dressed in uniform during the lecture. Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l6880.htm. Accessed on: 4 Nov. 2021.

²² Following the Army Discipline Regulation (Decree 4.346/2002), which specifies disciplinary offenses and establishes rules regarding punishments, there is no mention of removal from office as a punitive measure for disciplinary transgressions. Such punishments, in increasing order of severity, are: “Article 24 [...] I – a warning; II – disciplinary impediment; III – reprimand; IV – disciplinary detention; V – disciplinary imprisonment; and VI – discharge and exclusion for the sake of discipline.” This leads us to believe that the removal from the military position held by the individual is an informal punitive method aimed at bypassing the opening of the Administrative Disciplinary Procedure (PAD) provided for in the Regulation.

he's going to be removed." "But what about...?". "No problem, it's all resolved. It's already gone to the corridor." You already know: when you remove an officer from a command position, from an administrative office, or even from a branch, there's a procedure: you place him at the disposal of the Army commander. At the disposal of the commander, he stays in the corridor, without a role. So we placed him at the disposal... He stayed at the disposal of the Army commander and left that position.

The other case, General Heleno, who was a very different person from this one here [General Santa Rosa]... **This one didn't have the leadership that Heleno had within the Army.** So Heleno made some statements, **which, materially, were correct, about the indigenous land issue and about how Funai was handling it, etc.** And then I called Heleno. Then people from Funai, from the Ministry of Justice, in short, people... wanted to remove Heleno. So I did the opposite; I called Heleno and said, "Look, I only ask that you don't talk about the subject anymore. Can I count on you?". "Minister, no problem, I won't talk about it anymore." "Then you will stay." Then everyone came at me. Until I said, "I won't fire him, no. **He will stay. He is important,** he will stay, and he won't talk about it anymore (CPDOC, 2015, p. 11-13, emphasis mine, our translation).

That is, given the high prestige that Heleno enjoyed within the institution²³, a characteristic extensively reiterated by journalists during the episode, the general was not removed from his position, but was advised not to make any more public statements. However, the two cases in question here emerge as a privileged opportunity to observe how the opposition of military *culture* to "civilians" (or, as they call them, *paisano*, to refer to them as *non-military person*) is structured as the basis for a *political action* of persuasion of *others*, with structural consequences for the trajectory of certain generals of the Brazilian Army who, by subjecting themselves to media exposure, became integrated into the social imagination that ultimately led to the political consolidation of their military careers (CASTRO, 2004; LEIRNER 1997; 2020).

The contrasting structuring of military culture emerges as Heleno's positions imbue the Amazonian issue with a military dimension by filling it with the dimension of *national sovereignty*, which the Armed Forces are constitutionally destined to preserve. Therefore, demarcation processes triggered by "civilians" deemed *ignorant* of the "Amazonian reality," resulting from their supposed "absence in the region", can only lead to a reaction by the Armed

²³ In 1986, upon finishing first in his class at the Army Command and General Staff School, General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira was awarded the "Marshal Hermes Medal – Application and Study" in gold with a three-crown laurel ribbon for also being the top graduate at the Military Academy of Agulhas Negras and the School of Advanced Officers, prestigious positions within the Armed Forces. Throughout his career, he held positions in prestigious locations, such as serving as the first force commander of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and in the Amazon Military Command. Source: <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/augusto-heleno-ribeiro-pereira> Accessed on: 3 Aug. 2022.

Forces, who, *being knowledgeable about the region due to their presence there*, are at their level of competence to oppose the actions of the federal government, which is, above all, "civil."

A symbolic dimension specific to military culture is crystallized here, in which the Amazon and the Armed Forces become interchangeable signifiers. In this dimension, when speaking about the Amazon and indigenous lands, the military is talking about themselves and their belonging to the Army, that is, to a chain of command-obedience governed by the complete absence of "civilians," which circumscribes feelings of belonging to the institution based on socializing elements associated with that region of the country (LEIRNER, 1995; 1997; 2012; 2020; CASTRO, 2004 [1990]; 2002; CASTRO AND SOUZA, 2012; MARQUES, 2007; MARTINS FILHO; ZIRKER, 2000).

The episode involving General Heleno highlights how this same chain is immediately activated to carry out a true *military operation of social communication* among journalists and politicians²⁴, conducted by various active-duty and reserve military personnel. Not surprisingly, it is possible to observe a homogenization of the positions taken by the military who follow the lecture, both regarding the issue at hand (the Amazon/indigenous lands) and regarding the realization that there were no elements in Heleno's statements that would constitute a breach of hierarchy and/or discipline (MOREIRA, 2021). After all, from a military perspective, the general had been duly authorized by the Army Commander to give the lecture (hierarchical dimension) and had expressed opinions and positions shared and defended by *almost everyone*, and therefore, *self-evident* to any military member, whether current or former, of the Armed Forces (disciplinary dimension) (WAGNER, 2010).

Thus, there is a process of hierarchical and disciplinary structuring of Heleno's positions and those of all the other military personnel who follow him. These positions, which exploit symbolic elements of belonging to an institution that socializes its members in relative isolation from the "outside world," went unnoticed by the majority of "civilians" who also took a position in the lecture (MOREIRA, 2021, our translation). It is not surprising to note that, in some cases, the *civilian* perception of the process only made sense of Heleno's statements through the argument of "personal opinion," perceiving the general as a physical person and not a moral one, that is, dissociated from his role as a *spokesperson* for the Army (BOURDIEU, 2004, p. 189; CLASTRES, 1978, p. 103). Alternatively, they assigned responsibility for the content of

²⁴ While a "military operation" can be understood as the "set of actions carried out with military forces and means, coordinated in time, space, and purpose, in accordance with what is established in a directive, plan, or order for the fulfillment of an activity, task, mission, or assignment" (BRASIL, 2017), "social communication" refers to a "force multiplier" that, among other objectives, seeks to "shape public opinion" (BRASIL, 2009a).

the lecture to external elements of the chain of command: ultranationalist groups linked to reserve military personnel, especially the Brazilian Center for Strategic Studies, which aimed to co-opt active-duty military personnel in relation to their "[...] fiery discourse against Brazilian indigenous policy" (CAVALCANTI-SCHIEL, 2009, p. 150, our translation).

In the civilian perception, everything happens as if, when talking about the Amazon and indigenous lands, Heleno is externalizing concepts that are foreign to the culture legitimized by the Army for its personnel, resulting from this process, particularistic, focused, and consequently limited *calls for order* to manifest themselves either in the removal of such military personnel from their positions (as in the case of Santa Rosa), or in the condemnation of their publicly made statements (as in the case of Heleno), without the military culture associating that institution with the Amazon being challenged. In this case, such association was reiterated both discursively and legally: on July 22 of that year, after the lecture, the Lula government published Decree No. 6,513, which was established in its Art. 3-A the duty of the Army Command to establish "[...] permanent military units, *in addition to those already existing*, in indigenous lands located in the border strip [...]"^{25 26}.

In addition, with the revocation of sections of Decree No. 4,412 of October 7, 2002, the new text established that the Army Command would no longer need to consult the Executive Secretariat of the National Defense Council, FUNAI, or even the affected indigenous populations to install military units on indigenous lands, submitting such projects only to consultation by the Ministry of Defense and the Presidency of the Republic. The following month, in line with the new decree, Nelson Jobim, accompanied by Heleno, stated that new Special Frontier Platoons would be installed in indigenous reserves even "against the will of NGOs linked to the indigenous," which "could protest as much as they wanted" (O GLOBO, 2008b, our translation).

However, despite public knowledge since May 8, via the press, that the government was drafting a decree that would seek to reinforce the military presence in indigenous lands, this did not prevent, on the 10th of that same month, three weeks after Heleno's lecture at the Military Club, a demonstration by rice farmers, politicians, and merchants from Roraima opposed to the demarcation of the TIRSS from ending in an event inside the 1st Jungle Infantry Brigade (Boa Vista - RR), accompanied by a lecture for the demonstrators by the Brigade

²⁵ http://www.pla.nalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2008/decreto/d6513.htm. Accessed on: 14 July 2021.

²⁶ According to journalist Jailton Carvalho, the initiative would be "[...] an attempt to reduce military resistance to the creation of large reserves in border areas" (CARVALHO, 2008b).

Commander, General Eliéser Girão Monteiro Filho, hierarchically subordinated to the CMA commanded by General Heleno (ÉBOLI, 2008a).

In addition to expressing support for his superior officer, Heleno, Monteiro stated that the demarcation process represented a “risk to national sovereignty” and gave instructions to the demonstrators: “Demand respect for your property and dignity and demand that food and fuel can pass [through the reserve]. The land that is there, even though it is within the Raposa, still belongs to your family. They are [sic] yours [...],” and he added: “[...] by what right do these indigenous people do this [prohibition of non-indigenous entry into the reserve]? It is up to FUNAI to control this.” At the end of the event, Monteiro denied that what had happened was a political demonstration, which would constitute a disciplinary transgression; after all, according to him, such a demonstration would be held on a stage or podium, and there he was receiving more than 30 demonstrators “inside a room, in [his] barracks” (ÉBOLI, 2008a, our translation) – see figure 1.

Figure 1 – Rice farmers' protest within the 1st Infantry Brigade of the Jungle



Source: Éboli (2008a)

After the events were reported, Monteiro granted an interview to O Globo the following day, in which he stated, "The state should think carefully before making new demarcations or closing processes. Why create indigenous land and hand it over to an NGO to manage?" (ÉBOLI, 2008b). On the same day, May 11, O Globo reported that Monteiro's actions were received by the Palácio do Planalto as "an explicit act of insubordination"; however, the incident

did not receive comments or actions from the Lula government, despite constituting a series of events that transgressed military discipline²⁷ (CAMAROTTI, 2008).

Following the incident, Monteiro stepped down from the command of the 1st Brigade in August of that year (BRASIL, K., 2008), moving to Brasília to assume the position of Director of Transportation and Mobilization at the Army Logistics Command and Chief of the Planning and Management Office of the same command. He held these positions until March 2009 when, at his request, he retired to become the Secretary of Public Security for the State of Roraima under the government of José de Anchieta Júnior²⁸, a politician who played a significant role in trying to prevent the demarcation of the TIRSS. Monteiro, after successive political positions²⁹, was elected as a federal deputy for Rio Grande do Norte for the Social Liberal Party (PSL) in 2018.

It is possible to argue that Monteiro's case embodies the process by which media exposure of a "firm conviction" regarding the identity between the Army and the Amazon ends up producing clear situations of "convincing others" (LEIRNER, 1995, p. 130), revealing the dynamics of how the institution deals with other social and political actors, constituting a powerful operational interest group that serves as a revolving door between the barracks and politics. This dynamic will also mark the trajectory of the other generals analyzed here. On the other hand, as will be seen below, it is relevant to observe that despite the broad concessions made by "civilians" regarding the military presence in the Amazon, especially in indigenous lands³⁰, such initiatives did not prevent new episodes of "crises" and "insubordination" from emerging in the subsequent months, with a curious repetition of Army *spokespersons*.

²⁷According to the Army Disciplinary Regulations, disciplinary offenses that may be subject to punishment include: "31. Representing the military organization or the corporation in any act without proper authorization; 32. Assuming commitments, making statements, or disclosing information on behalf of the corporation or the unit they command or serve in without authorization; [...] 56. Participating, in a military area or under military jurisdiction, in discussions related to political-party or religious matters; 57. Publicly expressing opinions on political-party matters by active-duty military personnel without authorization; 58. Participating, in uniform, in political-party events; 59. Discussing or inciting discussion, through any means of communication, about political or military matters, unless duly authorized". Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2002/d4346.htm. Accessed on: 27 Jan. 2022. Additionally, according to the Military Statute: "art. 77 § 1º a) the use of uniforms in political-party events is prohibited." Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/16880.htm. Accessed on: 27 Jan. 2022.

²⁸ Available at: <https://generalgirao.com.br/quem-sou/>. Accessed on: 27 Apr. 2022.

²⁹ Monteiro remained the Secretary of Public Security of Roraima until February 2012, when he assumed the position of Secretary of Justice and Citizenship of the same state until July 2013. In 2014, he left Roraima and became the Secretary of Public Security of Rio Grande do Norte (RN), responsible for security during the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Natal, holding the position until 2015. Between January 2017 and March 2018, he served as the Municipal Secretary of Public Security, Civil Defense, Urban Mobility, and Traffic in Mossoró-RN. Available at: <https://generalgirao.com.br/quem-sou/>. Accessed on: 28 July 2022.

³⁰ In the case of Raposa Serra do Sol, concessions were not only made by the Executive branch but were also considered by the Judiciary. At the end of the validation process of the demarcation, the Supreme Federal Court

National Defense Strategy and National Human Rights Plan

If in 2007 General Maynard Marques de Santa Rosa had been dismissed from his position in the Ministry of Defense for his statements regarding the TIRSS, an analysis of the facts shows that shortly thereafter such "punishment" did not prevent him from making headlines again in two more episodes of "crisis" with the Lula government.

The first of these occurred in March 2009 when Santa Rosa, at the time Chief of the Army General Personnel Department (DGP), along with Generals Paulo César Castro, Chief of the Department of Education and Culture, and Luiz Cesário da Silveira Filho, Commander of the Eastern Military Command, drafted three documents with "criticisms" of the publication of the National Defense Strategy (END), which had been prepared by the Ministry of Defense and the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs. According to the three generals, the END was a "politically biased document without support in ideas of national consensus," endowed with "utopian" and "unfeasible" measures that favored modernization projects of the Air Force and Navy at the expense of the Army. It also sought to subject the procurement of weapons and equipment for the three Forces to the Ministry of Defense's Purchasing Department, an agency controlled by "civilians" (ÉBOLI, 2009; AZEDO; ROCHA, 2009). According to the generals, such centralization within the Ministry of Defense would allow for "the introduction of **idiosyncrasies typical of civilian administration**, such as corruption and influence trafficking" (MONTEIRO, 2009a, emphasis mine).

Commenting on the incident, the Army Commander, Martins Peri, sought to "reassure" the Minister of Defense, stating that the extent of the "criticisms" was not significant within the barracks. In reality, they were "specific" and related to "personal documents" presented only to "record their points of view" (MONTEIRO, 2009b).

The second episode occurred the following year when Folha de S. Paulo reported on February 10 that a letter signed by Santa Rosa with criticisms of the National Truth Commission (CNV), provided for in the third edition of the National Human Rights Plan (PNDH-3) launched in December 2009 (BRASIL, 2009b), had been circulating on the internet for over two weeks. In the letter, the CNV was described as a "commission of slander":

Entrusting fanatics with the search for truth is the same as handing over the chicken coop to the care of the fox. [...]

(STF) established conditions for the demarcation, including ensuring free passage for the Armed Forces within the Indigenous Land (MOREIRA, 2021).

The "Truth Commission" referred to in the January 13, 2010 decree³¹, will certainly be composed of the same fanatics who, in the recent past, adopted terrorism, the kidnapping of innocents, and bank robbery as means of fighting the regime to seize power. [...]

Therefore, this eccentric commission, inherently incapable of finding the truth, will be, at most, a "Commission of Slander (CATANHÊDE, 2010, online, our translation).

Commenting on the letter, once again, Army Commander Martins Peri stated in a note that it was "*a personal correspondence* of the said general officer improperly spread on the internet, therefore, *a personal opinion*." Nevertheless, General Santa Rosa was relieved of his duties at the General Personnel Department (DGP), remaining attached to the Army Commander's office until March of that year when he would be placed in reserve status for completing 12 years as a general officer. As journalist Eliane Catanhêde herself pointed out, with or without the letter, Santa Rosa would have been placed in reserve.

However, another dimension of the military "insubordination" episodes is presented here. On the one hand, events involving Heleno in 2008 informed us that the perception that such episodes *expressing personal opinions are not representative of the Army's culture* stemmed from "civilians." On the other hand, the events in question demonstrate that the institution itself, once situated in a relatively closed position in relation to the "outside world," was able to manipulate its internal rules to intentionally fabricate situations of apparent "punishment" coupled with normal military career movements: changes of command and retirement³².

The cases we have discussed exemplify this manipulation. Generals Paulo César Castro and Cesário da Silveira Filho, when "criticizing" the END in March 2009, were about to be placed in reserve compulsorily for having reached the 12-year limit as general officers (MONTEIRO, 2009a). Santa Rosa, who accompanied both in the "criticisms," would remain in his post until the following March when he would also be placed in reserve compulsorily by the same rule and would take the opportunity to "criticize" the government, just as his colleagues had done a year earlier. In other words, all of them would leave their positions with or without "criticisms" of the government. However, such movements were framed as "punishments" for the respective military officers.

³¹ The decree dealt with the creation of a Working Group that would draft the draft bill to establish the CNV (National Truth Commission). Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/CCIVIL_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Dnn/Dnn12389.htm. Accessed on: 9 July 2022.

³² As reiterated in footnote 16 above, the transfer of the occupied position does not constitute a disciplinary punishment provided for in either the *Army Disciplinary Regulations* or the *Military Statute*.

In parallel, if we return to Heleno, even though he made statements in April 2008, he would only be relieved of his position in April 2009, in compliance with an Army rule that Generals of the Army in the last four years of their careers spend half of that period in operational command positions, such as in the case of the CMA, and the other half commanding the Army Staff or some sectoral management organ, as was the case with Heleno, who was transferred to the DCT³³. However, despite being a normal and widely known movement for any other military officer, in 2011, Heleno, during his retirement ceremony, sought to portray the events of 2009 as a "punishment": "when I was appointed, they heard that I was being put in professional limbo. Without a doubt, the DCT had nothing to do with my profile and skills. By the decision of the supreme commander [President Lula], I had become the typical example of the wrong man in the wrong place"³⁴.

It is relevant to note that on the same occasion, and in a context where the National Truth Commission (CNV) had already generated a series of reactions from the Armed Forces (LEIRNER, 2020), another attempt at a "crisis" was rehearsed. At the end of March 2011, President Dilma Rousseff ordered that the *conventional* military celebrations on March 31, the date marking the civil-military coup of 1964, should not take place. It was precisely on that day that a lecture by Heleno titled "The counterrevolution that saved the country" had been scheduled. The lecture, which would "seal" the general's departure from active duty, was eagerly anticipated by other military personnel who would have the opportunity to hear his "outburst." However, the lecture was ultimately canceled by the Army Command as a means to "prevent the escalation of tensions in the midst of public debate on the establishment of the Truth Commission" (MALTCHIK, 2011).

It is interesting to note that while the episodes involving Generals Santa Rosa, Heleno, and Girão Monteiro Filho, during the Lula government, were directed toward the *Amazon issue* as a symbolic basis for their positions and political actions, reaffirming their affiliation with the Army through this avenue, gradually, this issue began to be accompanied by a reactivation of

³³ The operational commands are the Military Commands of the Northeast (CMNE), East (CML), Southeast (CMSE), West (CMO), Amazon (CMA), South (CMS), Plateau (CMP), and North (CMN). The exception to the rule stated is the CMP, commanded by a major general (3 stars) and not a full general (4 stars). As for the sectorial management bodies, they are the General Personnel Department (DGP), Engineering and Construction Department (DEC), Logistics Command (COLOG), Land Operations Command (COTER), Secretariat of Economy and Finance (SEF), Department of Science and Technology (DCT), and Department of Education and Culture of the Army (DECEX). I would like to thank Marcelo Pimentel Jorge de Souza, a retired officer of the Brazilian Army, for providing clarification regarding these distinctions.

³⁴ Available at: <https://m.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2011/05/913533-general-heleno-volta-a-defender-golpe-de-64-ao-passar-para-reserva.shtml>. Accessed on: 24 Apr. 2022.

anti-communism and its update in *anti-PT* sentiment, especially after the creation of the CNV (LEIRNER, 2020)³⁵.

Thus, we have four episodes in which normal movements within the Army were used as a platform for "crises" with the government. In these instances, the generals' statements were given personal meaning, and they were quickly "punished" by being removed from their positions, conveying to "civilians" a distorted perception that the "insubordinations" had been resolved, and hierarchy and discipline had been preserved, all without the use of the formal procedures outlined in the Army Disciplinary Regulations, such as the initiation of an Administrative Disciplinary Procedure to investigate possible disciplinary transgressions.

However, ultimately, these episodes also solidified the military capabilities of these generals in terms of power and political authority (LEIRNER, 2020). For example, Heleno's career always went hand in hand with media exposure³⁶, which found elements of personal distinction anchored in his disagreements with the Lula and Dilma governments. It is not surprising that as early as 2008, there were requests on social media for the general to run for the presidency³⁷, which would be reiterated in 2014, with a clear association with the "anti-PT movement" and with the figure of then-deputy Jair Bolsonaro³⁸.

Thus, with the formula of "crises" and "punishments" crystallized as a structuring element of an important dimension of the Army's political activity, it was now a matter of having this *example influence* other actors (SOUZA, 2021).

“What is happening here is the Army’s routine”

In 2008, while Heleno became known for his positions on the TIRSS, General Antônio Hamilton Martins Mourão was the commander of the 2nd Jungle Infantry Brigade in São Gabriel da Cachoeira (RR) and, therefore, subordinate to Heleno. However, unlike his hierarchical superior, Mourão would only gain national prominence in 2015 when he became the commander of the Southern Military Command (CMS).

On October 20, 2015, excerpts from a lecture by General Mourão, given on September 17 of that year at the Reserve Officer Preparation Center in Porto Alegre, became public:

³⁵ For an analysis of the history of anti-communism in Brazilian society and the Armed Forces, please refer to Motta (2000) and Santos (2009; 2014) respectively.

³⁶ As can be observed in his own account in Haswani (2016) and CCOMSEX (2021).

³⁷ <https://acervo.folha.com.br/leitor.do?numero=17518&keyword=Augusto&anchor=5215866&origem=busca&originURL=&pd=193be0b8ed3c574649d32be92d3fa1f3>. Accessed on: 9 July 2022.

³⁸ https://istoe.com.br/350106_O+CANDIDATO+DOS+MILICOS/ accessed on: 26 Apr. 2022

Most of today's politicians seem deprived of their own intellectual attributes and ideologies, while they master the technique of presenting grand illusions that lead voters to believe that those are the real needs of society. [...] [...] the mere replacement of PR [Dilma Rousseff] will not bring significant change to the 'status quo' [...] the advantage of change would be the **disposal of incompetence, mismanagement, and corruption**. [...] In this time of crisis, all autonomous, free, and virtuous consciousness **needs to awaken to the patriotic struggle**, contributing to the return of national self-esteem, pride in being Brazilian, and hope for the future (VIZEU 2015, online, our translation).

After the content of the lecture was disclosed, the news of his dismissal from the CMS came with an additional element that would have "contributed" to the decision: the commander of the 3rd Army Division, General José Carlos Cardoso, who was subordinate to Mourão, issued invitations to a posthumous tribute ceremony for Colonel Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra, former commander of the DOI-CODI in São Paulo, who had passed away on the 15th of that October (CRUZ; GIELOW, 2015, online).

Mourão's dismissal was reportedly agreed upon between the Minister of Defense, Aldo Rebelo (PCdoB), and the Army Commander, General Eduardo Dias da Costa Villas Bôas. Both reportedly agreed that Mourão "could not continue" (CRUZ; GIELOW, 2015, online), which pleased the government for the speed of the solution to place the general in a "bureaucratic position" within the Army's "cold storage" (FRANCO, 2015), specifically, the Secretariat of Economy and Finance of the Army. The action "*would serve as an example*" to other military personnel that "[...] this type of behavior is not acceptable from an active-duty Army general speaking to his subordinates" (MONTEIRO, 2015a, our translation), a perspective reiterated by Villas Bôas, who also used the incident to say that "a military officer has to speak, can speak. [...] **Society has become unaccustomed to hearing from the military**, and whenever the military speaks, it causes a reaction, repercussion, and it should not be like that" (MONTEIRO, 2015b, emphasis mine, our translation).

On the other hand, despite journalists, "civilian" authorities, and military officials giving a punitive sense to the incident, a statement from General Mourão at the ceremony marking his departure from the CMS in January 2016 reveals a different reality:

My departure was **a normal rotation within the Army**; normally, we stay around two years, and I was about to complete two years, so the commander saw fit to make this direct exchange between General [Edson Leal] Pujol and me. As for the statements made, I gave a lecture to the internal public, and some aspects of that lecture were selected and published. **So here, what is happening is the routine of the Army, nothing more than that** (TVE-RS, 2016, online, our translation).

Mourão, through his statements, much like General Heleno in 2008, garnered support from society in general through media exposure, a phenomenon that, if seen from one of General Villas Bôas's own accounts, seems to have been, at some point, the prevailing directive within the institution: "I encouraged the Army generals to be proactive and occupy communication spaces in their areas or sectors of activity. Gradually, we made progress and began to engage with the media" (CASTRO, 2021, p. 184, our translation). But that's not all.

One of the immediate results of this dynamic became evident in the pro-impeachment demonstrations against President Dilma Rousseff and pro-military intervention protests in 2015. Amidst these protests, it was possible to see an inflatable figure of General Mourão dressed in uniform and with a presidential sash on the lawn of the National Congress. Next to the figure, the same protesters simulated the funeral of Lula and Dilma (ÉBOLI, 2015) - see figure 2.

Figure 2 – Inflatable General Mourão (November 2015)



Source: Brito (2018)

However, repeating the steps of Generals Heleno and Santa Rosa, Mourão, one year later, returned to the news, even after being supposedly "punished." On September 18, 2017, it became publicly known that he had given a lecture at the Masonic Lodge in Brasília. On that occasion, in addition to making negative comments about the Lula and Dilma governments, the general declared:

I'm speaking here about the way the Army thinks. [...] In my view, which coincides with the view of my colleagues in the High Command of the

Army, we are in a situation of [...] successive approximations until the moment when either the institutions solve the political problem through the action of the judiciary, removing from public life those involved in all the wrongdoings, or else **we will have to impose it**. [...] The powers will have to seek a solution, and if they fail to do so, the time will come when **we will have to impose a solution, and this imposition will not be easy, it will bring problems** (DEFESANET, 2017, online, our translation)

For journalists and "civilian" authorities, this statement was seen as an "insinuation" of a "military coup," as well as a comment directed at President Michel Temer, who had been charged by Attorney General Rodrigo Janot the day before the lecture for criminal organization and obstruction of justice (MONTEIRO, 2017a). After the incident, it was agreed between Villas Bôas and the Minister of Defense, Raul Jungmann, that Mourão would not be punished; the idea was not to turn the general into a "victim" since he was about to retire and run for the presidency of the Military Club (MONTEIRO, 2017B; FARIA; TRUFFI; MONTEIRO, 2017).

In this case, the formula of "personal opinion" was once again reiterated, which had become an important tool for confusing the "civilian" perception and erasing the disciplinary and hierarchical structuring of these positions. In that opportunity, Mourão and Villas Bôas constituted a duo of spokespersons who sometimes complemented each other and sometimes contradicted each other. If, in the first instance, during the lecture, Mourão claimed to represent the opinions of the High Command (MONTEIRO, 2017a), after the repercussions, both converged on the idea that only the latter could speak on behalf of the institution, as he was the Commander of the Army³⁹.

Additionally, within this dynamic, Mourão ended up embodying, in the eyes of "civilians," the already conventional role of an "authoritarian military officer" and "pro-military coup," while on the other end of this pincer action, Villas Bôas could, in the various interviews he gave, reiterate his position as a "democratic military, officer," conveying the idea that the Army acted within the bounds of "legality, legitimacy, and stability" and did not interfere in the political process. As already mentioned, this was a clear bad cop/good cop performance, respectively, normalizing the presence of both in the social imagination through continuous media exposure (LEIRNER 2020, p. 74).

Mourão, *still on active duty*⁴⁰ returned to the headlines in December of that year. On this occasion, *for the third time*, the content of another lecture he gave became public, this time

³⁹ <https://globoplay.globo.com/v/6160237/?s=0s>. Accessed on: 24 Apr. 2022

⁴⁰ Regarding the regulations governing the use of military uniforms in political contexts, it is specified in Article 77, Section 1(a) of the Statute of Military Personnel: "The use of the uniform in political party demonstrations is prohibited." You can access the full document here: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l6880.htm.

at the invitation of the "Terrorism Never Again" (Ternuma) group. In addition to expressing support for Jair Bolsonaro's presidential candidacy, Mourão made references to then-President Michel Temer: "there is no doubt that currently we are experiencing the famous 'Sarneyization' (referring to former President Sarney). Our current president is struggling to stay in power through backroom deals" (FRAZÃO, 2017, our translation).

Once again, the episode was used to give the impression of "punishment":

The Army will ask the Minister of Defense, Raul Jungmann, to remove General Antonio Hamilton Mourão from his position as Secretary of Economy and Finance of the Army Command after he stated that President Michel Temer turned the government into a 'bargain counter' to stay in power. Mourão will be without a function waiting for his time to retire in March 2018. In his place, the Army Commander, Eduardo Villas Bôas, appointed General Luiz Eduardo Ramos Baptista Pereira (ESTADO DE MINAS, 2017, online, our translation).

Even though Mourão's retirement had been planned since September, his public statements did not fail to create confusion among journalists, as evidenced by the last excerpt described. However, following in the footsteps of Santa Rosa and Heleno, the retirement ceremony in February 2018 would itself be used as a platform to expose the prevailing thinking of the Army regarding the "fight against communism": a laudatory remembrance of the Army's actions against the "Communist Insurrection" and the "victorious journey of the 1964 Revolution," with extended thanks to Colonel Ustra, considered a "hero" by the general (LIMA, 2018, online, our translation). After the ceremony, in which the general was hailed by the Army Commander as a model of "leadership by example," Mourão declared to journalists that "the 'Judiciary needs to do its job and expel from public life people who are not fit to participate in it,' adding that this understanding also includes President Michel Temer" (DEFESANET, 2018, online, our translation).

In retirement, Mourão took on the role of "facilitator" for the campaigns of military candidates from the Armed Forces in 2018 (VICTOR, 2018, online), providing the "guidelines of action" and aligning the speeches of candidates such as Generals Eliéser Girão Monteiro Filho (PSL), Roberto Sebastião Peternelli Junior (PSL), and Paulo Chagas (PRP)⁴¹. Another


Accessed on January 10, 2022. As for the regulations on public expressions by military personnel, it is stated in the Army Disciplinary Regulations under Section 57 that: "Military personnel on active duty shall not publicly express themselves on political-party matters without proper authorization; [...]". You can access the full document here: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2002/d4346.htm. Accessed on: 7 Aug. 2022.

⁴¹ Among the three generals you mentioned, only Paulo Chagas was not elected. He ran for the office of Governor of the Federal District but was not successful in the election. On the other hand, Girão Monteiro was elected as a

candidacy that received attention from the general, even during his active service and contrary to the Army Disciplinary Regulations (Decree 4,436/2002) and the Military Statute (Law 6,880/1980), was that of Lieutenant Colonel Luciano Lorenzini Zucco.

Running for state deputy in Rio Grande do Sul for the PSL, Zucco received political support from the general in a video where both appeared in uniform in the offices of the Army's Finance and Economics Secretariat commanded by Mourão. In the video, posted only when the general was in retirement – demonstrating an interest in bypassing possible punishments – he states: "we need people who have knowledge, capability, and determination to confront this [public security crisis] and impose the necessary measures so that our population regains the right to come and go and live in peace in our country. This is Zucco, you can count on him" (GENERAL..., 2018)⁴² – see figure 3.

Figure 3 – Mourão and Zucco at the Army's Financial and Economic Secretariat



Source: General... (2018).

In addition to political involvement, the cases described here reveal a characteristic pattern of behavior akin to the OODA loop applied to the "civilian sphere"⁴³, producing *cognitive dissonance* and *amplifying a confirmation bias frame* in the public's perception. This was done to shape the public opinion that, despite military "crises" having emerged, they had

federal deputy representing Rio Grande do Norte, and Peternelli was elected as a federal deputy representing São Paulo.

⁴² Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xy72TaTJ1xA_. Accessed on: 3 Sept. 2023.

⁴³ The OODA loop consists of the dimensions "observe," "orient," "decide," and "act." For further details, refer to Leirner (2020).

been swiftly resolved by the Army's own chain of command, ultimately preserving military hierarchy and discipline (LEIRNER, 2020, p. 103-106).

In the cases presented in this article, it becomes evident how the "military sphere" could generate a series of perceptual errors in the "civilian sphere." The civilian sphere began to perceive the frequent removals from positions as plausible punitive tools—despite the absence of such mechanisms formally outlined in the Military Discipline Regulations. Simultaneously, they directed their focus not towards the military culture legitimized by the Army in the socialization of its personnel but rather towards the "personal opinions" publicly expressed.

Regarding this, Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira (1994) draws attention to how the right to political discourse remained an unwritten rule in the Armed Forces even after the end of the dictatorship: "According to this rule, not all military personnel can speak; not all who do so, even if they should not have, will be punished. This is not a universal right applicable to high-ranking officers; it is essentially discretionary."⁴⁴

The fact that Generals Santa Rosa, Ribeiro Pereira, Girão Monteiro Filho, and Martins Mourão were not punished through the opening of Administrative Disciplinary Proceedings does not mean that the absence of punishments is a historical constant in the military milieu⁴⁵. Both in the past and in the events described here, it is important to demonstrate that "nothing happens to them because the application of military regulations is essentially political" (IBID, p. 189). Once carrying such a nature, it becomes repetitive to assert the dissimulative character adopted by the chain of command, which, outwardly, claimed to be applying regulations for the sake of discipline and hierarchy, "punishing" these military personnel through the removal from their positions, while, inwardly, not utilizing any of these regulations, using the routine movements of those senior officers to further dramatize the alleged "punishments."

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 189

⁴⁵ We can recall here Generals Newton Cruz and Eclides Figueiredo, punished in June 1989 with imprisonment for 8 and 10 days, respectively, for calling the then Minister of the Army, Lêonidas Pires Gonçalves, "coward" and "negligent" (O GLOBO, 1989). Subsequently, in May 1990, both were again disciplined for criticizing the then-President of the Republic, Fernando Collor de Melo. Cruz was imprisoned for ten days, while Figueiredo received a written reprimand (SOBRAL, 1990; O GLOBO, 1990). In all cases, the punishments involved the generals taking positions in newspapers and were based on the Disciplinary Regulation and the Statute of the Military.

Conclusion

With the end of the dictatorship, the Brazilian Armed Forces went through a period of "identity crisis" with strong influences on their doctrinal-ideological apparatus (MARTINS FILHO, 2000). During this period, in addition to a redefinition of the Brazilian Amazon's role, particularly concerning the Army's activities, the institution sought to assert its interests in the 1988 Constitution, especially regarding topics like Military Justice, internal deployment to ensure "law and order," and the maintenance of compulsory military service (OLIVEIRA, 1994; VIANA, 2021).

Following this political involvement, which did not cease after the work of the National Constituent Assembly, more recent research has identified a role that seems to be carried out in the fashion of an informal political party. Characterized by Oliveira and Kalil (2021), the so-called *Military Party*⁴⁶ would present a permanent hardcore nucleus and an organizational structure that replicates that of the Armed Forces, based on hierarchy and discipline. Without a defined program, the Party's primary objectives would be the achievement of corporate (not institutional or personal) goals and the occupation of positions by its own base (military personnel from the Armed Forces and security forces).

Additionally, Marcelo Pimentel Jorge de Souza (2021), from an "internal" perspective of the Brazilian Army, highlighted other elements characterizing the militarization vectorized by that Party. It is a hegemonic political group with historical memory and institutional vocation, a defined ideological base, agendas of collective and specific corporate interests, a "party" leadership distributing internal power, "party" cadre members, and electoral and militant base. Crucially, with the election of Jair Bolsonaro, this group assumed control of the government in direction, sense, and intensity, beyond merely occupying positions in the Federal Executive and adopting policies that favored the Armed Forces.

In this context, amid political parties and figures characterized as "populist" that seem to mimic the algorithmic pattern of digital networks to satisfy the diverse expectations of voter-customers, while undermining democracy from within its own institutions (LEVITSKY; ZIBLATT, 2018; EMPOLI, 2019; NORRIS; INGLEHART, 2019), we can identify the phenomenon of the Military Party as having hybrid characteristics. These characteristics blur the lines between Politics and War and vice versa and operate to blur the boundaries between

⁴⁶ The authors rely on the concept of the "*Partido Fardado*" (Military Party) from Ferreira (2000) and the compilation organized by Rouquié (1990) on "*Os Partidos Militares no Brasil*" (The Military Parties in Brazil), updating these formulations to understand the process of politicization of the Armed Forces in the context of Jair Bolsonaro's election in 2018. See also Oliveira and Kalil (2021).

the public and private spheres (LEIRNER, 2020), including the corporate, institutional, and personal dimensions.

Not surprisingly, in a chronic context of weakening civilian control through *competition* (political, symbolic, and media) (BELIAKOVA, 2021), strategies such as public appeals through media statements, endorsement of candidates, building alliances with other sectors of society and institutions, as well as parliamentary lobbying (BROOKS, 2009), have continued to manifest even after achieving "corporate agendas." The case of the Army's involvement in the Amazon, particularly in discussions about the Raposa Serra do Sol Indigenous Land, appears to exemplify this process. The military's "complaints" in this case, such as unrestricted military access to Indigenous Lands and a greater presence in the Amazon region, were already guaranteed by law and had been reaffirmed in new Executive and Judicial regulations. Despite this, "undisciplined" generals continued to act politically and through the media on the issue (MARQUES, 2007; LEIRNER, 2020; MOREIRA 2021).

It is precisely in this sense that the systematic analysis of events involving Generals Santa Rosa, Ribeiro Pereira, Girão Monteiro Filho, and Martins Mourão reveals that, beyond the findings that the episodes in question constituted disciplinary transgressions (MARTINS FILHO, 2010; 2019), it can be inferred that these episodes of "insubordination," "crisis," and "indiscipline" are an important byproduct of the segmentation that runs through the institution through its hierarchical channel. The "punitive solutions" are structured as an *almost* autonomous way for the institution itself to produce stabilizations that repress the sense of belonging of its military personnel to the institution, as opposed to the "civilians/civilians" (LEIRNER, 1997; 2020). It is not a coincidence that all the episodes discussed here involve symbolic elements that, at some point in the history of the Army, were *conventionalized* as defining the identity of the institution and its military personnel. These elements find their socializing power in the Amazon and anti-communism/anti-PT sentiments (CASTRO, 2002; CASTRO AND SOUZA, 2012; MARQUES, 2007; LEIRNER, 1995; 2020; MOTTA, 2000; SANTOS 2009; 2014).

It would not be an exaggeration to state that the institution's culture and its political actions owe much to these moments of apparent "tension" with "civilians," which are effective precisely because of their constant incompleteness, in "solutions" that can only be partial and provisional. It is for this reason that "undisciplined military" continue to emerge even after a succession of episodes granting extensive "civil" concessions to their "complaints" and "corporate agendas."

Similarly, the media exposure of those generals resulted not only in institutional and corporate gains, such as changes in regulations regarding Indigenous land demarcations but also in personal gains. For example, Mourão joined the Brazilian Worker Renewal Party (PRTB) and Heleno joined the Progressive Republican Party (PRP), both in April 2018 (MANTOVANI, 2018; ÉBOLI, 2018). By being part of the winning ticket that year, Mourão became Vice President of the Republic, Heleno became the Chief of the Institutional Security Office, and even General Santa Rosa became the head of the Special Secretariat for Strategic Affairs until December 2019, while Eliéser Girão Monteiro Filho was elected as a federal deputy. This seems to confirm the thesis that this informal party has been successful in forming leaders and "cadres," possessing an electoral and militant base that extends beyond the military institution itself (Souza, 2022). This informal party takes advantage of moments of democratic erosion carried out by other bodies, such as the emergence of outsiders or "low clergy" (Nobre, 2022), and contributes personally to such erosion, with a protagonism that resembles the format of a political party in action (OLIVEIRA; KALIL, 2021).

In this context, the political action of those military personnel reiterates the goals of domesticating society and the State itself as a whole, a view typical of military personnel in countries with a colonial history. Without an autonomous military-industrial complex and engaged in endless non-military activities, *military patriotism* manifests itself as the guarantor of the capitalist status quo (DOMINGOS NETO, 2019). In certain cases, this extends beyond the defense of dominant groups and corporate agendas in favor of the Armed Forces, focusing on the military as the only, "elite" capable of coordinating the integration of society, conceived as a profusion of disconnected "archipelagos" (LEIRNER 1997).

REFERENCES

ALBERTINI, L. P. O Exército e os Outros. *In*: CASTRO, C.; LEIRNER, P. de C. (org.). **Antropologia dos militares**: reflexões sobre pesquisas de campo. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. FGV, 2009.

ANGELO, C. Cada país tem o seu Custer, diz Possuelo. **Folha de S. Paulo**, 19 apr. 2008.

AZEDO, L. C.; ROCHA, L. Divergência com Jobim. **Correio Braziliense**, 11 mar. 2009.

BELIAKOVA, P. Erosion of Civilian Control in Democracies: A Comprehensive Framework for Comparative Analysis. **Comparative Political Studies**, v. 54, n. 8, p. 1393–1423, 2021.

BOURDIEU, P. **Coisas Ditas**. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 2004.

BRASIL. **Política de Defesa Nacional**. Brasília, DF: Presidência da República, 1996.

BRASIL, K. Exército troca comando em Roraima e coloca general com posição neutra sobre reserva. **Folha de S. Paulo**, 29 set. 2008.

BRASIL. **Manual de Campanha C 45-1: Comunicação Social**. 1. ed. Brasília, DF: Ministério da Defesa, 2009a.

BRASIL. **Decreto n. 7.037, de 21 de dezembro de 2009**. Aprova o Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos - PNDH-3 e dá outras providências. Brasília, DF: Presidência da República, 2009b. Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2009/decreto/d7037.htm. Accessed in: 10 Jan. 2022.

BRASIL. **Manual de Campanha EB70-MC-10.223 Operações**. 5. ed. Brasília, DF: Ministério da Defesa, 2017.

BRITO, O. Fotografia é História: Há três anos, em frente o Congresso. **Os Divergentes**, 5 nov. 2018. Available at: <https://osdivergentes.com.br/orlando-brito/fotografia-e-historia-ha-tres-anos-em-frente-o-congresso>. Accessed in: 10 Jan. 2023.

BROOKS, R. Political activity by the military in democracies. *In*: NIELSEN, S. C.; SNIDER, D. M. (ed.). **American civil-military relations: The soldier and the state in a new era.** [S. l.]: JHU Press, 2009.

CAMAROTTI, G. Raposa: Planalto cobra explicação de Jobim. **O Globo**, 11 maio 2008.

CARVALHO, J. de. General: reserva ameaça soberania. **O Globo**, 11 abr. 2008a.

CARVALHO, J. de. Governo decide reforçar as fronteiras. **O Globo**, 8 maio 2008b.

CARVALHO, J. de; BERLINCK, D. Lula: soberania de território é do Estado Brasileiro. **O Globo**, 12 abr. 2008.

CASTRO, C. **A invenção do Exército brasileiro.** Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2002.

CASTRO, C. **O espírito militar: um estudo de antropologia social na Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras.** Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2004.

CASTRO, C. (org.). **General Villas Bôas: conversa com o comandante.** Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2021.

CASTRO, C.; SOUZA, A. B. de. A defesa militar da Amazônia: entre história e memória. *In*: **Exército e nação: estudos sobre a história do exército brasileiro.** Rio de Janeiro: Ed. FGV, 2012.

CATANHÊDE, E. Plano cria “comissão da calúnia”, diz general. **Folha de S. Paulo**, 10 fev. 2010. Available at: <https://acervo.folha.com.br/leitor.do?numero=18174&keyword=MAYNARD&anchor=5880754&origem=busca&originURL=&pd=557fdd562ac7ee5f1a660f7252059f4b>. Accessed in: 10 Jan. 2022.

CAVALCANTI-SCHIEL, R. A Política Indigenista, Para Além dos Mitos da Segurança Nacional. **Estudos Avançados**, São Paulo, v. 23, n. 65, 2009.

CCOMSEX. **A evolução do grande mudo**: os 40 anos do Centro de Comunicação Social do Exército na visão dos seus chefes / organização Monica Gugliano, Carlos Dároz – Brasília, DF: CCOMSEX, 2021.

CENTRO DE PESQUISA E DOCUMENTAÇÃO DE HISTÓRIA CONTEMPORÂNEA DO BRASIL (CPDOC). **Nelson Jobim IV (depoimento, 2013)**. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getulio Vargas, 2015.

CLASTRES, P. **A sociedade contra o estado**: pesquisas de antropologia política. Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves, 1978.

CORTINHAS, J. S.; VITELLI, M. Limitações das reformas para o controle civil sobre as forças armadas nos governos do PT (2003-2016). **Revista Brasileira de Estudos de Defesa**, v. 7, p. 187-216, 2020

CRUZ, V.; GIELOW, I. Defesa exonera comandante do Exército que criticou governo. **Folha de S. Paulo**, 30 out. 2015. Available at: <https://acervo.folha.com.br/leitor.do?numero=20393&keyword=general%2CMourao&anchor=6006518&origem=busca&originURL=&pd=fae19dc39623514038acfe9fcf5e4ae3>. Accessed in: 03 Sept. 2023.

DEFESANET. Palestra General Mourão Grande Oriente do Brasil. 16 set. 2017. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Njp-7k7N3sY&t=303s>. Accessed in: 03 Sept. 2023.

DEFESANET. **Gen Ex Mourão**: Passagem para a Reserva. 28 fev. 2018. Available at: <https://www.defesanet.com.br/terrestre/noticia/28555/gen-ex-mourao-passagem-para-a-reserva/>. Accessed in: 10 Jan. 2022.

DOMINGOS NETO, M. Sobre o patriotismo castrense. **Revista Perseu**, São Paulo, ano 13 n. 18, p. 13-35, 2019.

ÉBOLI, B. Militar que chefiou tropas no Haiti é cotado para o Senado em ‘chapão’ de generais. **Gazeta do Povo**, 7 jun. 2018. Available at: <https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/politica/republica/eleicoes-2018/militar-que-chefiou-tropas-no-haiti-e-cotado-para-o-senado-em-chapao-de-generais-0rb4ro5tv2zwrarsarc2w10134/>. Accessed in: 10 Jan. 2022.

ÉBOLI, E. Sem apoio, PF pode abortar ação em reserva. **O Globo**, 4 set. 2007a.

ÉBOLI, E. Jobim demite general. **O Globo**, 29 maio 2007b.

ÉBOLI, E. Quartel do Exército abriga ato contra reserva. **O Globo**, 10 maio 2008a.

ÉBOLI, E. General critica ONG de proteção aos índios. **O Globo**, 11 maio 2008b.

ÉBOLI, E. Generais criticam plano nacional de defesa. **O Globo**, 04 mar. 2009.

ÉBOLI, E. Manifestantes exibem boneco inflável de general que criticou governo. **O Globo**, 17 nov. 2015. Available at: <https://oglobo.globo.com/politica/manifestantes-exibem-boneco-inflavel-de-general-que-criticou-governo-18070976>. Accessed in: 03 Sept. 2023.

EMPOLI, G. D. **Os Engenheiros do Caos**. São Paulo: Vestígio. 2020.

ESTADO DE MINAS. **General do Exército é destituído de cargo após elogiar Bolsonaro e criticar Temer**. 9 dez. 2017. Available at:

https://www.em.com.br/app/noticia/politica/2017/12/09/interna_politica,923437/general-do-exercito-e-destituído-de-cargo-apos-elogiar-bolsonaro-e-cri.shtml. Accessed in: 10 jan. 2022.

FARIA, T.; TRUFFI, R.; MONTEIRO, T. Comissão convida Jungmann para explicar declaração de general. **O Estado de S. Paulo**, 21 set. 2017.

FERNANDES, L. Raposa Serra do Sol. A questão de honra do general Heleno. **Brasil de Fato**, 18 dez. 2018. Available at: <https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2018/12/18/raposa-serra-do-sol-or-a-questao-de-honra-do-general-augusto-heleno>. Accessed in: 3 Aug. 2022.

FERRAZ, I.; XAVIER, R. M. General crítico à Comissão da Verdade é nomeado auxiliar de Bolsonaro. **Metrópoles**, 22 fev. 2018. Available at:

<https://www.metropoles.com/brasil/politica-brasil/general-critico-a-comissao-da-verdade-e-nomeado-auxiliar-de-bolsonaro>. Accessed in: 3 Aug. 2022.

FERREIRA, O. S. **Vida e Morte do Partido Fardado**. São Paulo: Ed. Senac, 2000.

FOLHA DE S. PAULO. **General crítico ao governo recebe apoio de colegas**. 19 abr. 2008.

FRANCO, B. M. General na Geladeira. **Folha de S. Paulo**, 01 nov. 2015. Available at:

<https://acervo.folha.com.br/leitor.do?numero=20395&keyword=Mourao&anchor=6006697&o>

rigem=busca&originURL=&pd=e51b9b6c3a7cd37f1dfdb28d45ba97f1. Accessed in: 03 Sept. 2023.

FRAZÃO, F. General afirma que governo faz ‘balcão de negócio’. **O Estado de S. Paulo**, 09 dez. 2017.

FREITAS, J. de. Em busca de crise. **Folha de S. Paulo**, 24 abr. 2008.

FUCCILLE, A.. Amazônia e Defesa Nacional: um olhar a partir da perspectiva brasileira. **PAIAGUÁS: Revista de Estudos sobre o Pacífico e Amazônia**, v. 2, p. 131-149, 2015.

GENERAL Mourão e Tenente-Coronel Zucco em Brasília. [S. l.: s. n.], 2018. 1 vídeo (1min). Publicado pelo canal Deputado Zucco. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xy72TaTJ1xA>. Accessed in: 10 Jan. 2022.

GOIS, A. Sinal Amarelo. **O Globo**, 10 mar. 2008.

HASWANI, M. Entrevista: General Heleno: do Comando da Amazônia à comunicação do COB. **Revista ALTERJOR Grupo de Estudos Alterjor: Jornalismo Popular e Alternativo (ECA-USP)**, ano 7, v. 1, n. 13, jan./jun. 2016.

HOBBSAWM, E. Introdução: A invenção das tradições, in E. Hobsbawn & Terence Rangel (orgs.). **A invenção das tradições**. Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1997.

INSTITUTO SOCIOAMBIENTAL. **Povos Indígenas no Brasil: 2006-2010**. São Paulo: Instituto Socioambiental, 2011.

LEIRNER, P. **Meia-Volta, Volver**: um estudo antropológico sobre a hierarquia militar. 1. ed. São Paulo: FGV/FAPESP; Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 1997.

LEIRNER, P. O exército e a questão amazônica. **Estudos Históricos**, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, p. 119-132, 1995.

LEIRNER, P. O Estado como Fazenda de Domesticação. **R@U: Revista de Antropologia da UFSCar**, v. 4, n. 2, p. 38-70, jul./dez. 2012.

LEIRNER, P. **O Brasil no Espectro de uma Guerra Híbrida**. Militares, operações psicológicas e política em uma perspectiva etnográfica. São Paulo: Alameda, 2020.

LEVITSKY, S.; ZIBLATT, D. **Como as democracias morrem**. Rio De Janeiro: Zahar, 2018.

LIMA, E. Despedida do general Mourão para a reserva. YouTube, 28 de fevereiro de 2018. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KF3j1QJdk_A. Accessed in: 04 Sept. 2023.

LOURENÇÃO, H. J. **Forças Armadas e Amazônia**: (1985-2006). Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Campinas, SP, 2007.

MALTCHIK, R. Exército manda que general se cale sobre 64. **O Globo**, 01 abr. 2011.

MANTOVANI, K. General Mourão filia-se ao PRTB e pode ser candidato a presidente pelo partido. **Folha de S. Paulo**, 8 maio 2018. Available at: <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/05/general-mourao-filia-se-ao-prtb-e-pode-ser-candidato-a-presidente-pelo-partido.shtml>. Accessed in: 10 Jan. 2022.

MARQUES, A. A. **Amazônia: pensamento e presença militar**. 2007. Tese (Doutorado em Ciência Política) – Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2007.

MARTINS FILHO, J. R.. O governo Fernando Henrique e as Forças Armadas: um passo à frente, dois passos atrás. **Olhar (UFSCar)**, São Carlos, SP, v. 4, n.4, p. 104-120, 2001.

MARTINS FILHO, J. R.. Globalização e Forças Armadas no Brasil. **Crítica Marxista (São Paulo)**, São Paulo, v. IX, n.15, p. 85-106, 2002.

MARTINS FILHO, J. R. Tensões militares no governo Lula (2003-2009): a pré-história do acordo com a França. **Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política (Impresso)**, v. 4, p. 283-306, 2010.

MARTINS FILHO, J. R. Ordem desunida: militares e política no governo Bolsonaro. **PERSEU: História, Memória e Política**, v. 13, p. 167-193, 2019.

MARTINS FILHO, J. R. (org.). **Os militares e a crise brasileira**. 1. ed. São Paulo: Alameda, 2021.

MARTINS FILHO, J. R.; ZIRKER, D. Nationalism, National Security, and Amazonia: Military Perceptions and Attitudes in Contemporary Brazil. **Armed Forces & Society**, v. 27, n. 1. 2000.

MATOS, K. G. e. **Ordem e Progresso na Amazônia: o discurso militar indigenista**. Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciências Sociais) – Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2010.

MONTEIRO, T. Dilma se irrita com Funasa na Amazônia. **O Estado de S. Paulo**, 14 out. 2007.

MONTEIRO, T. Almirante critica reserva em Roraima. **O Estado de S. Paulo**, 16 maio 2008.

MONTEIRO, T. Generais criticam 'politização' no setor. **O Estado de S. Paulo**, 3 mar. 2009a.

MONTEIRO, T. Jobim ouve chefe do Exército sobre crítica. **O Estado de S. Paulo**, 04 mar. 2009b.

MONTEIRO, T. General que pediu 'o despertar de uma luta patriótica' é afastado. **O Estado de S. Paulo**, 30 out. 2015a.

MONTEIRO, T. 'Há uma crise ética, mas instituições cumprem seu papel'. **O Estado de S. Paulo**, 31 out. 2015b.

MONTEIRO, T. Exército pode 'impor' solução, afirma general. **O Estado de S. Paulo**, 18 set. 2017a.

MONTEIRO, T. Jungman descarta punir general Mourão. **O Estado de S. Paulo**, 22 set. 2017b.

MONTEIRO, T.; NOGUEIRA, R.; PARAGUASSÚ, L. Lula cobra general por crítica a reserva. **O Estado de S. Paulo**, 18 abr. 2008.

MOREIRA, G. A. L. da S. **General Augusto Heleno**: Terra Indígena Raposa Serra do Sol e a demarcação de uma política militar. 2021. Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso (Bacharelado em Ciências Sociais) – Universidade Federal de São Carlos, São Carlos, 2021.

MOTTA, R. de S. **Em Guarda Contra o Perigo Vermelho**: o anticomunismo no Brasil (1917-1964). Tese (Doutorado em História Econômica). São Paulo: USP, 2000.

NOBRE, M. **Limites da democracia: de junho de 2013 ao governo Bolsonaro**. São Paulo: Todavia, 2022.

NORRIS, P.; INGLEHART, R. **Cultural Backlash**. Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

O ESTADO DE S. PAULO. **Conflagração evitada**. Notas e informações. BR-A3. 12 abr. 2008.

O GLOBO. Generais punidos por criticar governo. **O Globo**, 12 maio 1990.

O GLOBO. Newton Cruz também deve ser punido. **O Globo**, 2 jun. 1989.

O GLOBO. A Amazônia será sempre nossa. **O Globo**, 7 maio 2008a.

O GLOBO. Exercício militar na fronteira com Venezuela. **O Globo**, 12 ago. 2008b.

OLIVEIRA, A. A. P. As forças armadas e as lutas populares no Brasil: breve introdução. *In*: BUZETTO, M. (org.). **Democracia e Direitos Humanos no Brasil**: A ofensiva das direitas (2016/2020). 1. ed. São Paulo: Central Única dos Trabalhadores, 2021a. v. 1, p. 1.

OLIVEIRA, A. A. P. O partido militar no sistema político brasileiro. *In*: CASTRO, L. I.; BUGARIN, M. S.; SCHWARTZ, F. P. (org.). **Anais do Simpósio Interdisciplinar sobre Sistema Político Brasileiro e XI Jornada de Pesquisa e Extensão da Câmara dos Deputados**. Santo Ângelo: Metrics, 2021b. p. 473-489.

OLIVEIRA, A. A. P.; KALIL, S. M. Ação política do Partido Militar no Brasil sob Bolsonaro. **Anuario Latino-Americano: Ciencias Políticas y Relaciones Internacionales**, v. 11, p. 63-82, 2021.

OLIVEIRA, E. R. de. A Estratégia Nacional de Defesa e a Reorganização e Transformação das Forças Armadas. **Interesse Nacional**, abr./jun. 2009.

OLIVEIRA, E. R. de. **De Geisel a Collor: forças armadas, transição e democracia**. Campinas, SP: Papyrus, 1994.

ROUQUIÉ, A. **Os partidos militares no Brasil**. São Paulo: Record, 1990.

SAINT-PIERRE, H. L.; WINAND, Érica C. A fragilidade da condução política da defesa no Brasil. **Revista de História (UNESP)**, v. vol. 2, p. 3-29, 2010.

SANTOS, E. H. de J. **Extrema-Direita, Volver! Memória, ideologia e política dos grupos formados por civis e militares da reserva**. Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciência Política). Niterói: UFF, 2009.

SANTOS, E. H. de J.; ALVES, V. C. Os grupos de pressão formados por militares da reserva e o pensamento anticomunista. **Mediações - Revista de Ciências Sociais**, Londrina, v. 19, n. 1, p. 135–150, 2014.

SILVA, M. I. da C. **Raposa Serra do Sol: agentes políticos, conflitos e interesses**. 2012. Tese (Doutorado em Ciência Política) – Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Campinas, SP, 2012.

SOBRAL, E. General diz para Collor “dar tiro na cabeça”. **O Estado de S. Paulo**, 11 maio 1990.

SOUZA, M. P. J.de. A palavra convence, o exemplo arrasta. *In*: MARTINS FILHO, J. R. (org.). **Os militares e a crise brasileira**. 1. ed. São Paulo: Alameda, 2021.

TABAK, F.; MENEZES, M. Cúpula militar critica governo. **O Globo**, 17 abr. 2008.

TVE-RS. O Comando Militar do Sul tem novo comandante, o general de exército Edson Leal Pujol. 27 jan. 2016. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQIaCbaOakE&list=PLyeH38I_AwXoT9zXiYBz9vMC R1LHcue6j&index=6&t=1s. Accessed in: 24 Apr. 2022.

VIANA, N. **Dano colateral**: a intervenção dos militares na segurança pública. 1. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 2021.

VITELLI, M. Back to basics: assessing military involvement in politics in contemporary Brazil. **Brasiliana: Journal for Bazilian Studies**, v. 10, p. 10-28, 2022.

VITOR, F. General Mourão anuncia frente de candidatos militares nas eleições. **Folha de S. Paulo**, 28 fev. 2018a. Available at: <https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/general-mourao-anuncia-frente-de-candidatos-militares-nas-eleicoes/>. Accessed in: 10 Jan. 2022.

VITOR, F. O vice e o cavalo. **Revista Piauí**, dez. 2018b. Available at: <https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/o-vice-cavalo/>. Accessed in: 10 Jan. 2022.

VIZEU, R. General pede “despertar para luta patriótica”. **Folha de S. Paulo**, 20 out. 2015. Available at: <https://acervo.folha.com.br/leitor.do?numero=20383&keyword=Mourao&anchor=6005229&origem=busca&originURL=&pd=9dae2e320d9b13c5b1f4ddb4ec593ebb>. Accessed in: 03 Sept. 2023.

WAGNER, R. **A Invenção da Cultura**. São Paulo: Cosac & Naify, 2010 [1981].

CRediT Author Statement

Acknowledgments: I would like to thank the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) for funding the research, as well as Prof. Dr. Piero C. Leirner and the anonymous reviewers for their careful reading and suggestions made to the text.

Funding: National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq).

Conflicts of Interest: There are no conflicts of interest.

Ethical Approval: Not applicable.

Data and Material Availability: All data and materials used in the work are properly referenced and can be freely accessed.

Author's Contributions: Sole authorship.

Processing and editing: Editora Ibero-Americana de Educação.
Proofreading, formatting, normalization and translation.

