

**WOMEN'S POLITICAL UNDER-REPRESENTATION IN STATE LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLIES: 2002-2022**

***SUB-REPRESENTAÇÃO POLÍTICA FEMININA NAS ASSEMBLEIAS LEGISLATIVAS
ESTADUAIS: 2002-2022***

***SUBREPRESENTACIÓN POLÍTICA FEMENINA EN LAS ASAMBLEAS
LEGISLATIVAS ESTATALES: 2002-2022***



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ABSTRACT: This article will evaluate the women's underrepresentation in the twenty-seven legislative assemblies of the federation in the electoral cycles from 2002 to 2022 – also aggregated data for the Brazilian regions by way of inter-regional comparison. The systematic study of electoral statistics illustrates the condition of proportionality of representation in state legislatures after more than 20 years of Law n° 9.504/1997, which implemented party quotas for female candidates. The collected results suggest the maintenance of an under-representation situation in the evaluated period, with marginal improvements observed in the 2018 and 2022 general elections.

KEYWORDS: Gender. Representation. Elections. Quotas.

RESUMO: Este artigo irá avaliar a sub-representação feminina nas vinte e sete assembleias legislativas da federação nos ciclos eleitorais de 2002 à 2022 – também agregados os dados para as regiões brasileiras a título de comparação inter-regional. O estudo sistemático das estatísticas eleitorais dados eleitorais ilustra a condição da proporcionalidade de representação nos legislativos estaduais passados mais de 20 anos da vigência da Lei n° 9.504/1997, que implementou cotas partidárias para candidaturas femininas. Os resultados coletados sugerem a manutenção de um quadro de sub-representação no período avaliado, com melhorias marginais observadas nas eleições gerais de 2018 e 2022.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Gênero. Representação. Eleições. Cotas.

RESUMEN: Este artículo evaluará la subrepresentación femenina en las veintisiete asambleas legislativas de la federación en los ciclos electorales de 2002 a 2022 - agregando también los datos de las regiones brasileñas a modo de comparación interregional. El estudio sistemático de estadísticas y datos electorales ilustra la condición de la representación proporcional en las legislaturas estatales más de 20 años después de la promulgación de la Ley n° 9.504/1997, que implantó cuotas partidarias para candidatas. Los resultados recogidos sugieren que la subrepresentación continuó durante el período evaluado, observándose mejoras marginales en las elecciones generales de 2018 y 2022.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Género. Representación. Elecciones. Cuotas.

Introduction

The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) published, in 2021, Studies and Research - Social and Demographic Information n. 38. In this compilation of data, it is possible to see the picture of severe gender inequality in the most general aspects of Brazilian social life. In 2019, women received an average of 77.7% of the salary received by men occupying the same position in the workforce. The disparity is accentuated if we look at the highest salaries. In management positions, women received an average of 61.9% of what men received.

Contributing to the inequality is the fact that women, on average, are better educated than men. The proportion of people aged between 18 and 24 attending higher education is 21.5% among men and 29.7% among women. Attendance at secondary school is 76.4% among women, while for men it was 67.7% in 2019. At the political level, the scenario is no different from the colors seen in other areas. Although they make up the majority of the electorate - in 2022 there will be approximately 82 million female voters and 74 million male voters² - it is well known that there is a profound distortion in the political representation of women in Brazil. In the 56th Legislature of the Chamber of Deputies (2019-2022), only 15% of the parliament was made up of women representatives - of the 513 elected representatives, there were 77 women parliamentarians and 436 men. In the 57th Legislature (2023-2026), the level is 17%, with 91 elected female parliamentarians.

In the context of Latin America, Brazil is at the bottom of the list in terms of female representation in the legislature. Bolivia and Argentina are well-known success stories in terms of women's inclusion in formal political representation. Table 1 below lists Latin American countries and their respective rates of female parliamentary representation in 2022.

Table 1 – Female representation in Latin American parliaments in 2023

Bolivia	46%
Argentina	45%
Peru	40%
Ecuador	39%
Chile	35%
Colombia	29%
Uruguay	26%
Paraguay	19%
Brasil	17%

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2023

² Electoral data repository. Voter turnout | Voter profile. Brasília, DF: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral - TSE, 2022. Available: <https://sig.tse.jus.br/ords/dwapr/seai/r/sig-eleicao-eleitorado/painel-perfil-eleitorado?session=105397175181011>. Access: 10 Feb. 2023.

The axes of income, education and political representation illustrate a structural condition of gender inequalities being reproduced every year, with marginal improvements observed. In order to contribute to studies of gender inequalities, especially in the field of political representation, this study will look at female under-representation in the legislative assemblies of Brazilian states over the last twenty years, considering the electoral cycles of 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018 and 2022.

The choice of state as the unit of analysis arises from the intention of observing the dynamics of the proportionality of female representation in the different entities of the federation, capturing any interstate and interregional nuances. Studies in terms of political representation in the National Congress, using the federal governance environment as the unit of analysis, can miss relevant traits for the dynamics of representation at sub-national level. Furthermore, as Soares (1973) teaches, states have their own political dynamics and long traditions. An analysis of the status of female political representation in the legislative assemblies can shed light on the problem of under-representation from a complementary perspective to that seen in studies on the National Congress. After all, in the states do we see female under-representation in the legislatures? What is the degree in each unit? Are there different levels of under-representation when considering Brazilian regions?

In order to assess these issues, data on political representation by gender in the states will be collected to compare them with each other and with the federal legislature as a whole. Firstly, the discussion on gender differences in politics will be revisited and points will be highlighted that may be relevant to the low formal presence of women representatives in Brazilian legislatures, despite the quota policy for women's candidacies in Brazil. The second section will look at the data resulting from the electoral rounds between 2002 and 2022 to verify the picture of female political under-representation in the states. Finally, some inferences will be drawn by way of conclusion, as well as proposing a future research agenda on the subject.

Theoretical aspects

Below we will revisit some of the literature on politics and gender in order to provide a theoretical perspective on the problem before analyzing the electoral data. In this section we will try to answer questions about (i) the emergence of gender inequalities in politics in general; (ii) possible institutional tools for solving the problem; and (iii) which mechanisms are incorporated into these actions. Firstly, an observation on gender differences in terms of

political ambition will be proposed. Next, we will look at institutional aspects that represent, at the same time, barriers and/or possible mechanisms for the inclusion of women in political positions.

There is a vast literature on the characteristics and implications of the lack of female representation in politics (CHILDS, 2008; FOX; LAWLESS, 2014; KROOK, 2018). There are also many studies on the Brazilian reality of the issue (SANCHEZ, 2012; SACCHET; SPECK, 2012; CAMPOS *et al.*, 2020). One of the possible keys to analyzing the basis of differences in political representation by gender is systematic observation of political aspirations, as advocated by Fox and Lawless (2014). The authors investigate the differences in political ambitions between young women and men in the United States. The results suggest that the low political participation of women is deeper than just the result of institutional barriers. The authors found that there is a gender gap from before they enter adulthood - and political life. Young people of school age and at the start of higher education show a notable difference in their interest in politics. Young women are less likely to consider a career in politics (2014). The data gathered by the authors indicates that the differences remain even when the demographic aspect is taken into account. In other words, the gender gap in terms of political ambition is consolidated in a similar way in the different regions studied and different socio-economic realities.

Fox and Lawless (2014) also suggest that this gender gap is related to a set of pre-institutional sociological phenomena. These are (i) *family socialization* - young women report fewer discussions of a political nature in the family environment; (ii) *political context* - young men would be the majority in higher education courses in political science and government; (iii) *competitive experiences* - young men would have more professional advantages for having taken part in competitive activities, especially sports, during their formative years, compared to young women; (iv) *self-confidence* - young women tend to evaluate their professional qualities less positively; and (v) *gender identity and roles* - positive correlation between the presence of female political leaders and greater interest among young women in running for elected office.

These findings shed light on the intensity of gender differences in terms of political ambition at the very beginning of adulthood - and even before. Entry into politics, in this sense, already occurs on a profoundly disproportionate basis. On the one hand, it is possible to observe the difficult social transition in terms of women's political participation, given their relatively recent rise to some level of political equality - at least in formal terms. In this context, ingrained social and cultural content conditions future choices regarding political ambitions. On the other

hand, the social and political structure, which was once closed to female participation and is currently being opened³, has produced different forms of female inclusion in the electoral political environment - with results that are not always effective.

The fundamental concepts indicated by Fox and Lawless (2014) point to a problem rooted in socio-cultural habits and practices. Once this has been verified, let's move on to look at the institutional mechanisms used to mitigate gender disparity in political representation. We must question whether these cultural aspects are in fact impacted by institutional norms, following Norris (2005). Assuming the hypothesis of rational choice institutionalism, i.e. that institutional norms condition the behavior of political actors, parties and citizens in general, electoral norms aimed at including more women in political representation became widespread in several countries, especially during the 1990s⁴. Despite the set of "bloc" actions, in a relatively short space of time and similar to some degree, the results obtained after the implementation of these measures vary. In the Latin American scenario, Sacchet (2018) indicates that there is evidence of positive results, on average, in countries that have adopted measures to include women in formal politics - approximately 30% legislative representation in the lower houses in Latin America. Currently, with the exception of Venezuela and Guatemala, all countries in the region have adopted gender quotas for legislative elections. The Bolivian case stands out, with established gender parity - the 50/50 model.

In this regard, Pinto (2006) points out that parliamentary quotas are applied in two ways: quotas on party lists, i.e. reserving candidacies for women; and quotas for seats in the legislature for women parliamentarians. We argue that it is possible to recondition quotas as "indirect" to those that guarantee a certain proportion of female candidates, and "direct" quotas to those that guarantee a certain proportion of seats in parliaments for women representatives. In the case of indirect quotas, there are two possible outcomes: the case of spontaneous quotas, where parties act autonomously to increase formal political representation by women, and the case of compulsory quotas, when there is a horizontal rule for all parties on how to proceed - this being the Brazilian case.

By looking at different models of electoral rules and their practical results in terms of seats won by women, Norris (2013) reveals that electoral rules can be similar in different places and cases, although often with diametrically opposed results. Indirect laws that guarantee the

³ We use the term "opening phase" because we believe that the picture of female political representation is still far from proportional in many countries, including Brazil.

⁴ For a survey of countries that have adopted measures to include women in politics through institutional norms - laws and electoral rules - see Norris (2013, p. 20).

participation of a certain proportion of women in the total number of party candidates can have different outcomes, mainly due to the details of each rule. These details can, for example, guarantee a proportional female presence on the party list in an electoral cycle, in order to prevent female candidates from being relegated to districts where victory is highly unlikely, or even for female candidates to occupy the bottom of party lists. The author points out that these specifications can be responsible for considerably different results, as in the case of Argentina where, during the 1990s, a very detailed rule led to a rise from 4% to 30% in the number of women in the legislature. In the French case, at the beginning of the 2000s, the electoral rule aimed at increasing voter participation failed in its objectives by not specifying the issue of proportionality on the lists - and by imposing excessively lenient sanctions on parties that did not comply with the newly proposed quotas (NORIS, 2013). The parties' reading did not lead to a change in political culture, despite the direction of the rule.

In this sense, it is possible to infer that an "open" indirect law could only play a formal role in including women in the political-electoral environment, without any practical results. A "controlled" indirect law, so to speak, with more detailed processes for setting quotas for candidacies, could condition the behavior of political actors and result in an effective increase in female participation in political governance. Participation that could even go beyond the quotas established by electoral rules. As Fox and Lawless (2014) point out, the presence of women in political leadership positions per se would already increase the proportion of young women who intend to pursue a political career. Thus, a "controlled" indirect law could contribute to breaking the framework of female political under-representation in a relatively short space of time, approaching the effectiveness of a direct rule - when there is an effective reservation of seats for women.

The electoral norm, although central to overcoming the issue of under-representation, is not the only focus of challenges in this field. Sacchet (2018) points to the relevance of the electoral system as a variable in the problem. The majority system of political representation, where each district elects the representative who received the highest number of votes, is less inclusive in terms of female participation - on average, countries with this electoral system have a female participation of around 10% in parliaments. With only one candidate elected per district, this system favors "safer" candidates in order to win an election. Majority representation, in this sense, is linked to low levels of inclusion of social minorities in formal politics. On the other hand, the proportional representation system elects party candidates

according to the volume of votes in larger districts. In countries that use the proportional model, female representation averages 19%.

However, within proportional representation there are different formats for choosing candidates. There is the case of open lists, where candidates receive votes directly, and the final result indicates the order of the most voted; and the case of closed lists, where the party offers an already ordered list of candidates (CINTRA, 2005). The proportional system with closed lists tends to provide greater chances of female electoral success - precisely because it puts female and male candidates on an equal footing. In this way, variations in the electoral system itself influence the effectiveness of an electoral rule aimed at increasing the presence of women in formal politics.

Beyond the electoral system, there is literature indicating the relevance of campaign finances to women's low electoral performance (SACCHET; SPECK, 2012; MANCUSO, 2015). It is possible to verify a fundamental gender discrepancy in fundraising for electoral campaigns - systematically, male candidates raise larger volumes of funds compared to female candidates. In addition to the disadvantage in the gross amount of resources, on average, female candidates need a greater volume of financial resources in order to be successful. Therefore, this two-way disproportion reinforces the weight of gender inequality in terms of campaign finances.

In short, we found that the problem of female under-representation in formal politics (i) has origins that predate electoral dynamics, being rooted in socio-cultural habits and behaviors, so that the gap in women's political representation is a by-product of the social structure; (ii) it is possible to look for mechanisms to deal with the problem through institutional norms - as can be seen in a large number of democracies; and (iii) the practical results are different for cases of similar norms due to greater or lesser control and detail of these electoral norms - as well as the characteristics of each electoral system.

However, it should be borne in mind that the greater the specificity of a rule of this nature, the less party autonomy there is for decisions on selecting candidates - an aspect that is delicately dealt with by party leaders. The issue of party autonomy opens up a new window for debate and a broad field of discussion, the scope of which is beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, recognizing this possibility, while not going into the merits of the discussion, the following focus will be on the Brazilian case and the status of female political participation in the states.

Women's political representation in Brazil and the reality of the states

In this section, by way of an introduction to the institutional debates, we will look at the main legal frameworks that have sought to alleviate the low level of female presence in politics in Brazil. Next, we propose an investigation into the situation of female under-representation in the state legislative assemblies from the 2002 electoral cycle until the last elections in 2022. Finally, we will look at regional inequalities in terms of representation. Observing regional dynamics can provide information on different conditions within the Brazilian reality and thus contribute to a more accurate diagnosis of the issue.

On the initiative of federal deputy Marta Suplicy, then a member of parliament from the Workers' Party, the first gender quota initiative was approved in 1995, with Law n. 9,100. This law indicated 20% for female candidates in the 1996 municipal elections. Pinto (2006) points out that, with the reform of electoral legislation in 1997, through Law n. 9,504, a quota of 30% of women's candidacies was instituted - phased in, 25% in the municipal elections of 2000 and 30% in the general elections of 2002.

Two aspects of this legislation are worth highlighting, as they may have contributed to its low effectiveness in terms of increasing female representation in politics. Firstly, the 1997 regulatory framework established that parties could increase the number of candidates to 150% of the number of seats available in the legislature. In this way, parties would have room to allocate female candidates without threatening the space for male candidates. A second point to note is that the legislation indicated that parties could not occupy more than 70% of candidacies with men - in other words, there would be no sanction if parties did not guarantee 30% women in their candidacies, as long as male candidates did not occupy more than 70%.

In the end, the legislation indicated the existence of a reservation of vacancies for women, not a guarantee of female presence at a level of 30% of candidacies. This was an effective model for maintaining male political dominance. It was only in 2014 that the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) adopted the understanding that the quotas must, numerically, have at least 30% female candidates on the list of party candidates (SACCHET, 2018). Thus, the 2018 elections already have a quota mechanism to effectively guarantee 30% of female candidates on party lists.

By analyzing the electoral performance of women in state elections since 2002, it will be possible to assess the repercussions of changes in legislation. The relationship between the number of female candidates and the results of the polls, as well as absolute values of electoral performance, lay the foundations for future studies.

Methodology

The methodological strategy adopted for this research was exploratory, based on electoral statistics made available by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE)⁵. The following filters were applied to the database: (i) CARGO (office); (ii) SEXO (sex); (iii) SITUAÇÃO DA TOTALIZAÇÃO (totalization situation), (iv) UF (state). These filters concern the separation of data relating to candidacies for the position of State Representative and, in the case of the Federal District, District Representative; then a new separation of data by gender of the candidacies; and, finally, a filter on the electoral results, admitting as successful candidacies those classified as "ELEITO" (elected), "ELEITO POR MÉDIA" (elected by average) and "ELEITO POR QP" (elected by party quota), while the unelected candidacies as "NULO" (null), "NÃO ELEITO" (not elected) and "SUPLENTE" (replacement).

The data obtained after filtering made it possible to calculate the ratio between female/male candidacies and seats actually won. The choice to calculate a ratio of candidates to seats obtained is an attempt to verify a possible artificial increase in the presence of women in electoral politics, as a result of rules established to guarantee a minimum level of female candidates. Observing this ratio in addition to the data on seats actually obtained offers a perspective for such a judgment.

Results and discussion

As for the results obtained from the analysis of electoral information for state legislatures, the following tables show the data on female and male candidates. Table 1 shows, for each round of general elections since 2002, the number of female and male candidates per seat won. If we look at the data for 2002, it is possible to infer a discreet disparity between the candidates, with 18 female candidates per seat for 12 candidates - with the exception of Amazonas, with 84 female candidates per seat won, and Rondônia, with 53. We must stress, however, that this is relational data, and does not indicate a parity of results. Graph 2 shows that, on average, in this electoral cycle, 5 women were elected to the legislative assemblies compared to 34 men. In other words, in 2002 there was a slight difference in the number of


⁵ The data collected can be accessed through the Superior Electoral Court's Conjunto da Dados platform (TSE). Available: https://sig.tse.jus.br/ords/dwapr/seai/r/sig-eleicao-arquivo/ passo-1?p20_sq_conjunto_dados=4&clear=20,21,22,23,25&session=106863677030838&cs=1fvHIVt_ypSHG014EVBXRfPmEH3QY8vYsvP5HLeA2zBnbMD9MiQ4w7Bysp4ErJurSOJvXVnYMoBtUBDhP3XCuQ. Access: 11 Feb. 2023.

candidates/seats won between men and women, but absolute under-representation in terms of seats won.


In 2006, the scenario did not change much, with 17 female candidates per elected seat and 11 male candidates. From 2010 onwards, there was a substantial increase in the number of female candidates, without the same dynamic being seen in relation to male candidates. The distortion became more acute in the following elections, in 2014, when an average of 53 female candidates were needed for each seat in the legislative assemblies, compared to 13 male candidates. If we look at Graph 1, the dramatic increase in the average number of female candidates is a phenomenon of its own, unrelated to male candidates.

From a regional perspective, highlighted in Table 2, the dynamics of stability of the 2002 and 2006 cycles and the turnaround from 2010 onwards are also present. We highlight the case of the Midwest region, which has seen a severe increase in the ratio of female candidates to elected representatives since 2018, reaching a level of 76 female candidates for every elected representative, compared to 14 candidates for every elected representative⁶. The analysis broken down into regions reveals that, while there has been a consolidated picture of female under-representation in the states in recent elections, this is even more pronounced in the sub-national context.

Chart 1 – Candidatures by seat 2002-2022





⁶ See Table 5 in the Appendix.



Source: Devised by the author with Electoral Statistics, Superior Electoral Court (2023)


Cart 2 – Candidatures per seat obtained in the regions 2002-2022






Source: Devised by the author with Electoral Statistics, Superior Electoral Court (2023)

Graph 1 – Average number of candidatures per seat 2002-2022



Source: Devised by the author with Electoral Statistics, Superior Electoral Court (2023)

Graph 2 – Average number of elected seats 2002-2022



Source: Devised by the author with Electoral Statistics, Superior Electoral Court (2023)

Although there was strong growth on the female side in 2010 and 2014, graph 2 above shows that there is no change in the level of under-representation. It follows that the increase in female candidates has no impact on the low level of representation of women in state legislatures. The picture that emerged in the 2010 and 2014 cycles will continue in 2018 and 2022, with marginal progress in terms of elected representatives.

From observing the data in this section, we emphasize that the distortion in the relationship number of female candidates/seats elected already has 3 electoral cycles – 12 years. In 2022, on average, for each woman elected in the assemblies, 38 female candidates were needed, while men had 13 candidates per vacancy in state legislatures. In terms of elected parliamentarians, on average, there were 7 women in 2022 compared to 32 men. In short, we left 5 elected females on average in 2002.

Conclusive aspects

In this study we seek to explore female political representation in state legislative assemblies between 2002 and 2022. At the same time, we also group electoral data from a regional perspective. The objective of this study was to evaluate the condition of female state legislative representation in the last 20 years, after different institutional actions were adopted to introduce greater participation of women in formal politics.

From the data collection, a picture of under-representation in the legislatures in all 6 electoral cycles studied is made clear. On average, of the 39 seats in each legislative assembly, 5 women and 34 men were elected in 2002. Twenty years later, in 2022, 7 women were elected,


on average, and 32 men. Female representation goes from 13% in 2002 to 18% in 2022 – even though Brazil has around 53% of the electorate made up of women.

This under-representation occurs in all 27 units of the federation. There are, however, different dynamics from a regional perspective, with emphasis on the profound disparity experienced by the Midwest region in recent electoral cycles. The general picture in the states is in line with the level of female representation in the Chamber of Deputies. The Brazilian lower house had 8% of elected women in 2002 and 17% after twenty years.

The scenario resulting from the analyses developed brings us back to the theoretical aspects pointed out in the first section of this paper, which are that the problem of female under-representation in formal politics (i) has origins prior to electoral dynamics, being rooted in socio-cultural habits and behaviors, so that the gap in the political representation of women is presented as a by-product of the social structure; (ii) it is possible to look for mechanisms to deal with the problem through institutional norms - as can be seen in a large number of democracies; and (iii) the practical results are different for cases of similar norms due to greater or lesser control and detail of these electoral norms - as well as the characteristics of each electoral system.

In this sense, the data suggests that the low political representation in question has its roots in the Brazilian social structure. Of the institutional mechanisms adopted, the results observed over the last two decades have been marginal at both federal and state level. The condition of significant disparity existed in 2002 and continues to exist in 2022, as shown in Graph 3 below.

Graph 3 – Female representation Chamber of Deputies vs. legislative assemblies



Source: Devised by the author with TSE election statistics (2023)

The increase in the number of female candidates, in response to the institutional innovations implemented, has resulted in a profusion of candidates with derisory electoral performance, and the deduction of a substantial volume of false candidacies, or "oranges", is valid for occupying the percentage required by the electoral norm. This seems to be a problem in terms of detailing the rule and possibly increasing sanctions, following the reasoning of Norris (2013). It is not the aim of this research to investigate improvements to electoral legislation, although it is possible to overlook the low effectiveness of the current mechanisms. In view of the development of the representation framework between 2002 and 2022, 50/50 parity would be achieved in the states in approximately 130 years. At federal level, around 70 years.

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APPENDIX

Table 1

	2002			2006			2010		
	Fem. cand.	Obtained chairs	Female candidates per seat	Fem. cand.	Obtained chairs	Female candidates per seat	Fem. cand.	Obtained chairs	Female candidates per seat
AC	48	2	24.0	73	5	14.6	78	3	26.0
AL	27	2	13.5	30	3	10.0	71	2	35.5
AM	84	1	84.0	60	3	20.0	126	2	63.0
AP	38	4	9.5	45	3	15.0	92	7	13.1
BA	62	6	10.3	74	8	9.3	118	11	10.7
CE	77	8	9.6	87	2	43.5	175	6	29.2
ES	41	5	8.2	44	3	14.7	46	2	23.0
GO	50	8	6.3	41	7	5.9	138	2	69.0
MA	61	8	7.6	61	7	8.7	61	7	8.7
MG	85	10	8.5	100	7	14.3	169	4	42.3
MS	28	2	14.0	30	1	30.0	68	2	34.0
MT	29	1	29.0	14	1	14.0	80	2	40.0
PA	59	8	7.4	58	7	8.3	182	7	26.0
PB	30	6	5.0	21	4	5.3	73	6	12.2
PE	91	8	11.4	61	6	10.2	73	4	18.3
PI	17	2	8.5	22	3	7.3	58	7	8.3
PR	57	4	14.3	74	4	18.5	165	4	41.3
RJ	228	14	16.3	242	11	22.0	562	13	43.2
RN	33	4	8.3	18	4	4.5	33	3	11.0
RO	53	1	53.0	57	1	57.0	66	3	22.0
RR	103	3	34.3	56	3	18.7	131	2	65.5
RS	45	2	22.5	64	5	12.8	172	8	21.5
SC	39	2	19.5	39	3	13.0	106	4	26.5
SE	33	6	5.5	26	6	4.3	22	6	3.7
SP	216	10	21.6	263	11	23.9	571	10	57.1
TO	56	2	28.0	66	3	22.0	34	4	8.5
DF	137	5	27.4	134	3	44.7	224	4	56.0
<i>Average</i>	<i>68</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>18.8</i>	<i>69</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>17.5</i>	<i>137</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>30.2</i>

Source: Devised by the author

Table 2

	2014			2018			2022		
	Fem. cand.	Obtained chairs	Female candidates per seat	Fem. cand.	Obtained chairs	Female candidates per seat	Fem. cand.	Obtained chairs	Female candidates per seat
AC	164	4	41.0	152	3	50.7	117	3	39.0
AL	98	2	49.0	108	5	21.6	95	6	15.8
AM	163	1	163.0	204	4	51.0	149	5	29.8
AP	117	8	14.6	167	8	20.9	130	7	18.6
BA	206	7	29.4	197	10	19.7	308	8	38.5
CE	199	7	28.4	184	6	30.7	195	9	21.7
ES	181	4	45.3	193	3	64.3	179	4	44.8
GO	259	4	64.8	297	2	148.5	281	4	70.3
MA	191	6	31.8	180	8	22.5	185	12	15.4
MG	385	5	77.0	443	10	44.3	473	15	31.5
MS	147	3	49.0	116	0	-	136	2	68.0
MT	107	1	107.0	110	1	110.0	113	1	113.0
PA	244	3	81.3	229	10	22.9	217	7	31.0
PB	143	3	47.7	138	5	27.6	161	6	26.8
PE	174	5	34.8	212	10	21.2	196	6	32.7
PI	84	4	21.0	70	4	17.5	66	4	16.5
PR	267	3	89.0	239	4	59.8	297	10	29.7
RJ	618	8	77.3	769	12	64.1	525	15	35.0
RN	92	2	46.0	110	3	36.7	114	5	22.8
RO	145	3	48.3	153	2	76.5	147	5	29.4
RR	135	3	45.0	159	6	26.5	144	5	28.8
RS	226	7	32.3	275	10	27.5	270	11	24.5
SC	160	4	40.0	152	5	30.4	204	3	68.0
SE	62	4	15.5	112	6	18.7	117	5	23.4
SP	654	10	65.4	697	18	38.7	676	25	27.0
TO	86	3	28.7	78	5	15.6	108	3	36.0
DF	316	5	63.2	309	4	77.3	212	4	53.0
<i>Average</i>	<i>208</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>53.2</i>	<i>224</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>44.0</i>	<i>215</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>36.7</i>

Source: Devised by the author

Table 3

	2002			2006			2010		
	Masc. cand.	Obtained chairs	Masculine candidates per seat	Masc. cand.	Obtained chairs	Masculine candidates per seat	Masc. cand.	Obtained chairs	Masculine candidates per seat
AC	291	22	13.2	298	19	15.7	310	18	17.2
AL	188	25	7.5	210	24	8.8	260	25	10.4
AM	323	23	14.0	332	21	15.8	292	22	13.3
AP	234	20	11.7	209	21	10.0	246	17	14.5
BA	498	57	8.7	512	55	9.3	574	52	11.0
CE	390	38	10.3	481	44	10.9	428	37	11.6
ES	295	25	11.8	312	27	11.6	373	26	14.3
GO	432	33	13.1	438	34	12.9	507	39	13.0
MA	376	34	11.1	315	35	9.0	359	35	10.3
MG	633	67	9.4	753	70	10.8	934	73	12.8
MS	183	22	8.3	160	23	7.0	200	22	9.1
MT	240	23	10.4	160	23	7.0	227	22	10.3
PA	383	33	11.6	357	34	10.5	444	34	13.1
PB	173	30	5.8	229	32	7.2	245	30	8.2
PE	495	41	12.1	450	43	10.5	391	45	8.7
PI	183	28	6.5	158	27	5.9	167	23	7.3
PR	387	50	7.7	494	50	9.9	476	50	9.5
RJ	1426	56	25.5	1177	59	19.9	1287	57	22.6
RN	198	20	9.9	145	20	7.3	124	21	5.9
RO	325	23	14.1	341	23	14.8	317	21	15.1
RR	352	21	16.8	329	21	15.7	315	22	14.3
RS	773	53	14.6	422	50	8.4	454	47	9.7
SC	254	38	6.7	262	37	7.1	259	36	7.2
SE	171	18	9.5	156	18	8.7	119	18	6.6
SP	1209	84	14.4	1516	83	18.3	1601	84	19.1
TO	218	22	9.9	285	21	13.6	198	20	9.9
DF	528	20	26.4	512	21	24.4	660	20	33.0
<i>Average</i>	<i>413</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>11.9</i>	<i>408</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>11.5</i>	<i>436</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>12.5</i>

Source: Devised by the author

Table 4

	2014			2018			2022		
	Masc. cand.	Obtained chairs	Masculine candidates per seat	Masc. cand.	Obtained chairs	Masculine candidates per seat	Masc. cand.	Obtained chairs	Masculine candidates per seat
AC	367	20	18.4	319	21	15.2	242	21	11.5
AL	210	25	8.4	228	22	10.4	187	21	8.9
AM	438	23	19.0	453	20	22.7	294	19	15.5
AP	266	16	16.6	328	16	20.5	234	17	13.8
BA	466	56	8.3	446	53	8.4	605	55	11
CE	439	39	11.3	413	40	10.3	377	37	10.2
ES	390	26	15.0	421	27	15.6	355	26	13.7
GO	588	37	15.9	610	39	15.6	519	37	14
MA	397	36	11.0	355	34	10.4	374	30	12.5
MG	814	72	11.3	939	67	14	938	62	15.1
MS	288	21	13.7	239	24	10	253	22	11.5
MT	229	23	10.0	240	23	10.4	216	23	9.4
PA	536	38	14.1	463	31	14.9	435	34	12.8
PB	284	33	8.6	291	31	9.4	300	30	10
PE	377	44	8.6	469	39	12	415	46	9
PI	174	26	6.7	149	26	5.7	144	26	5.5
PR	580	51	11.4	528	50	10.6	605	44	13.8
RJ	1420	62	22.9	1696	58	29.2	1114	55	20.3
RN	183	22	8.3	220	21	10.5	206	20	10.3
RO	304	21	14.5	313	22	14.2	276	19	14.5
RR	289	21	13.8	326	18	18.1	263	19	13.8
RS	495	48	10.3	578	45	12.8	560	44	12.7
SC	332	36	9.2	317	35	9.1	413	37	11.2
SE	124	20	6.2	223	18	12.4	211	19	11.1
SP	1473	84	17.5	1477	76	19.4	1382	69	20
TO	197	21	9.4	156	19	8.2	204	21	9.7
DF	711	19	37.4	673	20	33.7	396	20	19.8
<i>Average</i>	<i>458</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>13.3</i>	<i>477</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>14.2</i>	<i>427</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>12.7</i>

Source: Devised by the author

Table 5

	Elected women						Elected men					
	2002	2006	2010	2014	2018	2022	2002	2006	2010	2014	2018	2022
AC	2	5	3	4	3	3	22	19	18	20	21	21
AL	2	3	2	2	5	6	25	24	25	25	22	21
AM	1	3	2	1	4	5	23	21	22	23	20	19
AP	4	3	7	8	8	7	20	21	17	16	16	17
BA	6	8	11	7	10	8	57	55	52	56	53	55
CE	8	2	6	7	6	9	38	44	37	39	40	37
ES	5	3	2	4	3	4	25	27	26	26	27	26
GO	8	7	2	4	2	4	33	34	39	37	39	37
MA	8	7	7	6	8	12	34	35	35	36	34	30
MG	10	7	4	5	10	15	67	70	73	72	67	62
MS	2	1	2	3	0	2	22	23	22	21	24	22
MT	1	1	2	1	1	1	23	23	22	23	23	23
PA	8	7	7	3	10	7	33	34	34	38	31	34
PB	6	4	6	3	5	6	30	32	30	33	31	30
PE	8	6	4	5	10	6	41	43	45	44	39	46
PI	2	3	7	4	4	4	28	27	23	26	26	26
PR	4	4	4	3	4	10	50	50	50	51	50	44
RJ	14	11	13	8	12	15	56	59	57	62	58	55
RN	4	4	3	2	3	5	20	20	21	22	21	20
RO	1	1	3	3	2	5	23	23	21	21	22	19
RR	3	3	2	3	6	5	21	21	22	21	18	19
RS	2	5	8	7	10	11	53	50	47	48	45	44
SC	2	3	4	4	5	3	38	37	36	36	35	37
SE	6	6	6	4	6	5	18	18	18	20	18	19
SP	10	11	10	10	18	25	84	83	84	84	76	69
TO	2	3	4	3	5	3	22	21	20	21	19	21
DF	5	3	4	5	4	4	20	21	20	19	20	20
Average	5	5	5	4	6	7	34	35	34	35	33	32

Source: Devised by the author