

**A Q STUDY OF THE BRAZILIAN POLITICAL ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION  
“WORLD CUP FOR WHOM?”: WHAT WOULD COME NEXT?**

***UM ESTUDO Q DAS RESPOSTAS POLÍTICAS BRASILEIRAS À PERGUNTA “COPA  
DO MUNDO PARA QUEM?”: O QUE VIRIA A SEGUIR?***

***UN ESTUDIO Q DE LAS RESPUESTAS POLÍTICAS BRASILEÑAS A LA PREGUNTA  
“¿MUNDIAL PARA QUIÉN?”: ¿QUÉ VENDRÍA DESPUÉS?***



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**ABSTRACT:** Internal conflicts known as “Jornadas de Junho” spread through the streets of Brazil in June 2013. At that moment, street art in Brazil asked the question: “World Cup for whom?” The three narratives of what the 2014 Football World Cup meant to Brazilians are fraught with conflict, as will be illustrated in this Q study, which draws on diverse theoretical perspectives and explores both qualitative and quantitative approaches. This Q Study was developed with 30 Brazilian residents with a questionnaire of images about these conflicts and protests, and also about the 2014 FIFA World Cup. A sample of 35 photos, cartoons, and collages was gathered to represent this concourse. As a result, the stories speak of conflicting emotions, dualities, and even anxiety, revealing a deep sense of social division and political dualities that lingered in the 2018 and 2022 presidential elections.

**KEYWORDS:** Q methodology. Subjectivity. Brazilian political context.

**RESUMO:** *Conflitos internos conhecidos como as “Jornadas de Junho” se espalharam pelas ruas do Brasil em junho de 2013. Naquele momento, a arte de rua no Brasil questionava: “Copa do Mundo para quem?” As três narrativas sobre o significado da Copa do Mundo de Futebol de 2014 para os brasileiros estão carregadas de conflito, como será ilustrado neste estudo Q, que se baseia em diversas perspectivas teóricas e explora abordagens qualitativas e quantitativas. O estudo Q foi desenvolvido com 30 moradores brasileiros por meio de um concourse de imagens referentes a esses conflitos, protestos e também à Copa da FIFA 2014. Uma amostra de 35 fotos, cartoons e colagens foi reunida para representar esse concourse. Como resultado, as histórias expressam emoções conflitantes, dualidades e até ansiedade, revelando um profundo sentimento de divisão social e polarizações políticas que permaneceram nas eleições presidenciais de 2018 e 2022.*

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** Metodologia Q. Subjetividade. Contexto político brasileiro.

**RESUMEN:** *Los conflictos internos conocidos como “Jornadas de Junho” se extendieron por las calles de Brasil en junio de 2013. En ese momento, el arte callejero en Brasil planteaba la pregunta: “¿Copa del Mundo para quién?” Las tres narrativas de lo que significó la Copa Mundial de Fútbol de 2014 para los brasileños están plagadas de conflictos, como se ilustra en este estudio de Q, que se basa en diversas perspectivas teóricas y explora enfoques cualitativos y cuantitativos. El estudio Q se desarrolló con 30 residentes brasileños con un concurso de imágenes sobre estos conflictos y protestas y también sobre la Copa Mundial de la FIFA 2014. Se reunió una muestra de 35 fotografías, caricaturas y collages para representar este concurso. Como resultado, las historias hablan de emociones encontradas, dualidades e incluso ansiedad, revelando un profundo sentido de división social y dualidades políticas que se han mantenido en las elecciones presidenciales de 2018 y 2022.*

**PALABRAS CLAVE:** Metodología Q. Subjetividad. Contexto político brasileño.

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## Introduction

A wave of popular demonstrations swept Brazil in June 2013; it went viral in a flurry of tweets and SMS messages, two long-established techniques of propagation. Brazilian demonstrators had learned from protests carried out in different countries, such as the 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States and the Los Indignados movement in Spain, also in 2011. Carrying on in their wake, Brazilians slaked their own thirst for using the most modern globe-changing technologies by filling the broadband with a public outcry, mostly among youth, interconnected via social media technologies. Their target: to drive public policies closer to their demands, both symbolic and material. Symptomatically, the protests underscored a huge gap between government policies and popular interests, while at the same time denouncing the corrupt closeness between political groups and private businesses. Based on a Q Study (see the next section for a detailed explanation), this paper tries to demonstrate that the protests in 2013 highlighted the embryo of political disputes that, in some sense, would take over the national debate and the changes in the Brazilian political context that, years later, in the 2018 and 2022 presidential elections, would express a deep sense of social division and political dualities.

Despite similarities to global events, the protests in the streets of Brazil in 2013, also known as the *Jornadas de Junho* (the Journeys of June), had unique features: a national color and rhythm, an identity of Brazilian-ness distinguishable in social networks and in the streets, and a new expression of political behavior. The various protests around the country initially arose to challenge increases in public transport fares and, within weeks, reached a climax during the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup games. Streets in more than one hundred cities and towns were filled—at first filled mostly with youths, middle-class families, and professionals, but soon these were joined by riot police, journalists, and opportunists of every stripe. The subsequent clashes led predictably to violence. But if one looks back, the events of 2013 can be understood as a symptom of a political and social division that was already underway and that would manifest itself more clearly in the years to come.

Moreover, having won widespread popular support, the protesters turned their efforts to sharp criticism of the conduct of the soccer World Cup in Brazil in 2014. That was how thousands of young people, who felt excluded from public policymaking, took to the streets of the country to protest the expenditures for the FIFA World Cup. The intention was clear: youths deprived of basic services in education, health, security, and public transport did not see any sense in the investment of billions of dollars to host an international event. When questioning

the need to hold the most important soccer championship on the planet, wouldn't it be right to ask whether the protesters were also questioning the idea that soccer is one of the pillars of Brazilian cultural identity?

Furthermore, problems related to corruption and questionable partnerships between public authorities and the private sphere had become targets of criticism and were soon adopted by right-wing parties and political groups that opposed Dilma Rousseff's leftist government. (The assumption of a “crusade” against corruption was the basis of the political platform of the Brazilian extreme right that, in part, led to the election of President Jair Bolsonaro in 2018). Not surprisingly, therefore, the counterattack by the government and the private sector—the direct beneficiaries of the expenditures—came in the form of patriotic advertising and public information campaigns in mass media, trying to erase the social and political contradictions that hosting the FIFA World Cup had put into the spotlight. Comparing social media with mass media, we can see that photographs and videos from the protests evidence a surprising social and cultural plurality going into action, democratic action, forming in real time. The clear and spontaneous emotion on people's faces was, for the most part, not recorded by journalists from traditional media. Not by coincidence, social media, in fact, would be the strategic tool most used by candidates, political parties, and voters in the subsequent elections of 2018 and 2022.

In a hodgepodge of colors, shapes, and aesthetics—a kaleidoscope of intentions and popular demands—the protests in 2013 and 2014 gave visibility to groups from multiple and diverse social segments. Having come together with energy, strength, and symbolic power into a collective rebellion, they wanted to show a corrupt political and partisan management model. Undoubtedly, they sought reform. At the time, some hasty analyses in the press claimed that the protesters had no specific political intentions, but the pundits did not look beyond the literal content of the messages expressed on the protesters' posters and banners. Deeper analysis reveals that, in their form and dynamics, the demonstrations can be seen collectively as a symptom of social problems in the Brazilian public scenario. They expressed new forms of political subjectivity that would deepen with the increasing use of social media in the next national elections, generally expressing a narcissistic behavior that allows one to defend their decisions based on imaginary issues. This inflection in politics announced the presence of new youthful protagonists, evidenced in photographs and videos in streets and on networks, doing politics in a new dynamic, stymying the agents of social control in a new way and thereby curtailing the power of public institutions. Young people on the streets represented a collective power able to shake the foundations of the old political logic of maintaining social order. As

Gunkel (2014, p. 36) said, “[...] in defacing or destroying both public and private property, vandals inflict symbolic violence on recognizable images of social power.” From then on, right-wing groups would appropriate the discourse that preached the discrediting of public institutions to justify anti-democratic and authoritarian acts. This attitude of disdain for symbols of social and institutional power would intensify as political agendas based on controversial themes drove some protesters’ actions years later, as seen in the political events of the 2018 and 2022 elections and, above all, in the scenes of invasion and depredation of public buildings in the Federal Capitol on January 8, 2023.

This is the era of social networks. If protest in the public space, consisting of both virtual social networks and action in the streets, did not express the end of indirect representative democracy, it at least gave impetus to the debate and led to the emergence of new forms of popular regimentation and construction of participatory citizenship. What would come next in the Brazilian political context?

At that time, improvised placards proclaiming, “The Giant Awoke!” were held high above smiling faces. Because of their broad symbolic spectrum, these great collective protests spurred a release of emotions, a generalized physical-emotional arousal reflecting a new social game, namely, a way of public engagement and political activism with roots in playful and ritualistic events (Stephenson, 1967).

In a hybrid aesthetic, of truly creative protest and political methods, they laid claim to new public spaces, such as virtual social networks. These new entities violated traditional public spaces such as streets, squares, and avenues, and hence violated the privileges once identified with those who controlled them. It seems that the protests reflected a kind of iconoclasm, an acting out against images, symbols, and representations (Gunkel, 2014). In fact, one’s own body could be used as a form of media, of stylization and aestheticization that reflects/embodies the emotional state of each subject. In short, people on the streets broke with the symbolic order, with the order of significance, and established a new state of things, an inversion of hierarchies of values and norms, a transgression of the order very similar to Carnival processes as described by the Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin (1999). For him, Carnival is a ritual spectacle that fuses expressions, gestures, and forms into new forms of sensory and symbolic language, as Soerensen (1982, p. 1, translated by the authors) comments:

The language is profound, practical, and sensitive, as evidenced by the gathering of people and the physical contact of bodies equipped with senses. The individual’s feelings show that everyone wants to be part of the collective

and a member of a great popular body. The collective unit is constituted by the dissolution of individual identities. The individual body discards being himself, to a certain extent, and joins with the others through costume and mask—a requirement for all individual bodies to form into a single body. Despite the alleged individual exchange and abandonment, the people feel their community unity as a concrete, sensitive, and material body.

In the streets in June 2013, it was possible to see bodies moving as if in a trance, without fakery or any staging, but in movement spontaneous to the context of the moment. The political protest had been completely carnivalized, complete with eroticism, fantastic costumes, and groups marching as if they were in a *samba school*. At that time, the political identity—in terms of political options and affiliations—of each of the protesters was still a mystery, even though public and private demands were at the heart of the protests. All this gave rise to a kind of fantasy orgiastic delight nourished by the collective movement of bodies in the streets. It became a dynamic game in which intersubjectivity found expression in explicit contact of bodies and the virtual exchange of messages, so ludic and poetic, without determinism or explicit controls. However, the cathartic power of June 2013 would soon be overshadowed by the use of national symbols as a political party strategy, reaffirming an old institutional rhetoric. In subsequent years, protests with spontaneous erotic connotations, as visible in the 2013 demonstrations, were replaced by rehearsed choreographies endowed with boastful symbolic content, as one could see in pro-impeachment acts in 2016, in the 2018 elections, and during the invasion of the Federal Congress in 2023, when, in a different kind of cathartic appeal, violence against property and public institutions commanded the protest agenda.

In 2013, there was a person behind every poster, and bodies that intertwined in a discursive polyphony (to quote Bakhtin once again) that, in the end, reverberated into one sound. “Few posters for so much trouble. Brazil woke up,” wrote one of the protesters, meaning that the creative protests had an outsize effect on the nation. The quantity and diversity of demands came from a wide social spectrum in Brazil, on personal, collective, and societal levels. Yet, on a national or worldwide level, the effect of such spontaneous protest is not predictable. Disparate groups and identities communicating and expressing themselves in this spontaneous, multimedia way result in a synthesis of the spirit of an era, a new phase of civil society and citizenship at the planetary level, according to Said (2014). However, the different demands would soon be reduced to a political spectrum, whether conservative or liberal.

As we mentioned, during the protests, the social division into two political groups was not clear, but it was there, beckoning to different political spectrums. Of course, an explicit



response to the protests was not long in coming from the government. If, on one hand, government campaigns justified the carrying out of the 2014 World Cup, on the other hand, opposition parties directed the protests against the President and her party: two political forces were trying to split the voters into two distinct, sectarian, rival, and irreconcilable groups, supported by the antagonism of opinions, as one could see later during the presidential impeachment process in 2015 and 2016.

The first response of the government came in the form of increased control of the streets by the military police to maintain order. This order to restrict public movement took on violent aspects, in some cases culminating in acts of destruction of public assets. At this point, a second reply from the government came through a media campaign and tried to discredit and disqualify the groups involved in the protests, as if the violent acts that had been committed could be linked broadly and indiscriminately to all participants of the demonstrations against the holding of the World Cup. It was not long, however, before the media pulled back on any intentions to stereotype the public movement, since, by doing so, they would go against public opinion and would be subject to criticism forged in social networks. Finally, in a third response, the federal government and large company sponsors of the Cup invested heavily in official propaganda and launched a huge campaign in which they outlined gains and the positive impact of an event the size of the World Cup. This campaign stressed national symbols and sought to raise the self-esteem of Brazilians, ultimately appealing to cultural elements that populate the national imagination. The boosterism evident in the media campaigns led many people to take a stand in favor of putting on the Cup. But at the same time, this belies the way in which public policies are usually carried out in Brazil, which somehow seems to demonstrate a contradiction of opinions and feelings or, at least, a desired investment that divides into two objects that do not cohere. In short, the boosterism raised the level of cognitive dissonance to new heights. In the following years, especially during the period of social isolation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, this cognitive dissonance would reach stratospheric levels of belief in fake news, conspiracy theories, and hard-to-believe scientific denialism, almost all of which had some political connotation. Furthermore, the emotional and uncritical adherence to nonsense discourses and contestable political agendas proposed by populist leaders is another example.

With a Q Study, this paper tries to understand what 30 Brazilian residents thought about the June protests in 2013. Based upon the question “World Cup for Whom?,” it explores the intersubjectivity of expression of feelings and opinions in a very complex political and communicative context. With this study, it is possible to perceive what, even in 2013, was the

gestation of a deep political division that would guide the Brazilian political context in the subsequent ten years.

### **The Q Study: Exploring the methodology**

In 1935, British physicist and psychologist William Stephenson announced the profound conjecture that a person's feelings could be identified and recorded in an interactive process, and in turn, these feelings could be compared with the feelings of others. Exploiting this insight, he created a methodology for the scientific study of subjectivity, which mixed qualitative and quantitative methods. This methodology enables objective analysis of subjective phenomena by comparing the opinions of respondents with respect to a representative sample of texts.

The Q methodology was created especially for studying human subjectivity as the affective field composed of feelings, motivations, attitudes, beliefs, and opinions of everyone. As Said and Goldman (2016) suggest, this method, very often used in political sciences, takes the actor's worldview and understanding as central. It involves synthesis, advances subjective knowledge, and opens the possibility for finding truth-value in subjectivity. Stephenson argues that subjectivity can be studied in a scientific and rigorous manner, modeled on the postulates of quantum physics and the mathematics of factor analysis. Factor theory in psychology and quantum theory in physics parallel each other; that is, the mathematical-statistical foundations are the same. The main objective of this methodology is to identify “feeling states” within factor structures that shape individual subjectivity and drive political actions.

The instrument designed to collect and analyze data is a Q sort. It enables analyzing subjectivity objectively and systematically through single case studies as well as comparing the viewpoints of different people. The Q method approach establishes relationships between the points of view, opinions, or impressions of respondents to a sample of items. The items (Q sample) can be comprised of a group of statements, photographs, images, or the like pertaining to a particular subject or topic (i.e., a Concourse). The subjects are instructed to sort the items into categories according to their subjective preference: from positive, neutral, to negative (for example, the scale can run from +5 to -5). The resulting individual classifications or Q sorts are correlated and subjected to a factorial analysis. Groupings of views or common impressions, known as factors, are then interpreted (see Brown, 1980; Goldman, 1990). The organization of the subjects' perceptions into fixed categories, in response to a fixed set of stimuli, facilitates



communication of subjectivity because the subjects of the study share the same definition and the same scale to describe a construct.

For the purposes of this paper, questions must be formulated. Perhaps one can proceed by sampling the symbolic forces of posters and banners displayed in the demonstrations? Or perhaps by sampling the symbolically content-rich patriotic propaganda and advertising? But, after all: in this milieu, with what and with whom do Brazilians identify? What are their political claims? What do they think about the 2014 FIFA Cup? The present Q study takes aim at these questions in Teresina, Brazil, a state capital in the northeast of the country, where street protests occurred. Even though the study was conducted in Teresina-PI and, as a result, many peculiarities of the regional context must be taken into account during the analysis, it can be said that, in general, the 2013 protests express elements of the national political context that were being formed in that period and followed some trends that were asserting themselves on a global level.

### The concourse

Now, in principle, a Concourse can be thought of as infinite and bounded; that is to say that while a Concourse can always be enlarged, it always has an edge or boundary of differentiation from all other Concourses. Usually, one consults a variety of books, newspapers, magazines, focus groups, and individual interviews to collect people's sentiments on the topic under scrutiny.

[I]n Q samples are in terms of statements or other stimuli drawn from some parent population. But whereas individuals are concrete entities that can't be drawn from populations of known boundaries [...] it is virtually impossible [...] to establish boundaries for a population of statements (Brown, 1980).

However, in the age of the Internet, smartphones, so-called social media, and the like, the task of defining a Concourse presents new challenges for assembly; these challenges arise due to unprecedented entrée to a multitude of readily available information sources. For the topic here, clearly, the Concourse of sentiment about “what does the World Cup mean to Brazilians” is to be found outside the usual sources, particularly because the various actors in the *Jornadas de Junho* extensively utilized the most modern communication technologies.

Furthermore, it is well known that the manipulation of images filled with emotional appeal encapsulates much. We chose to limit our foray into Brazilian sentiment to a Concourse of publicly available images by playing off the cliché that one picture equals a thousand words: a single image often evokes a variety of narratives, and thus a Q sample of such images would open the way to many possible factors. But one is mindful of limitations; it is wise to remember that a Q sample yields a rough-grained picture of communicability.

Seeking out expressly evocative images, a Concourse was acquired via Google image searches using the phrases “Copa 2014 FIFA” and “*Jornadas de Junho*,” conducted on March 22–25, 2014. From the thousands of posters, placards, cartoons, and news photographs available, more than four hundred make up a Concourse suitable for this Q study. It is comprised of a variety of sentiments toward the Cup expressed in visual form. Immediately, in surveying this Concourse, one encounters an atmosphere of direct confrontation: naked propaganda appeals utilize treasured images of the iconic Maracanã stadium, the statue of Christ the Redeemer, soccer idol Pelé, a child playing ball on a beach; spontaneously lettered placards reveal heart-rending conflicts between national pride and personal hurt.

Inspection in terms of the sources of the images indicated two broad levels, namely, images containing spontaneous commentaries and images created for and propagated by FIFA, the Brazilian government, commercial sponsors, news organizations, and the like. These two levels suggested a rough-and-ready design for selecting a Q sample.

**Table 1:** Exploratory Design for World Cup 2014 Q sample

Source	Designed	Ad-lib
Valence	Positive	Negative

Source: the authors.

After the images were selected, participants were suggested to choose the 35 most significant images. Thus, a Q sample of 35 images was constructed and administered to 30 residents of Teresina, women and men from different socio-economic classes, different age groups, fans and non-fans. Participants were asked to classify the 35 images from most significant to least significant. Nine centroids were extracted from the correlation matrix and a Varimax rotation was performed, which was then tweaked by further judgmental rotation, using PCQ for Windows. An acceptable solution was found, having two factors, A and B, with factor A being bipolar. For analysis purposes, factor scores for the two poles of factor A were estimated

independently and are labelled as Factor A+ and Factor A-, respectively. Above, detailed results (Table 2) and images (Figure 1) as they ranked by Factors.

**Table 2:** Characteristics of World Cup 2014 Centroid Solution

<p>FACTOR A+ (11 sorts)</p> <p>sort--load</p> <p>fem_42_c_professor 4 0.69</p> <p>fem_34_c_nurse 7 0.79</p> <p>fem_24_s_journalist 8 0.50</p> <p>masc_28_s_managing 14 0.68</p> <p>fem_36_s_house keeper 18 0.45</p> <p>fem_21_s_secretary 22 0.48</p>	<p>sort--load</p> <p>fem_29_s_designer 24 0.63</p> <p>masc_22_computing 25 0.49</p> <p>masc_29_s_system analyst 26 0.78</p> <p>masc_23_s_no work 28 0.47</p> <p>fem_20_s_studant 29 0.66</p>
<p>FACTOR A-(7 sorts)</p> <p>sort--load</p> <p>fem_33_s_accounting 9 0.50</p> <p>fem_45_d_marketing 11 0.67</p> <p>fem_23_s_studant 13 0.69</p> <p>fem_58_s_no work 15 0.49</p>	<p>sort--load</p> <p>masc_30_b_computing 16 0.59</p> <p>masc_51_c_taxi driver 17 0.50</p> <p>fem_28_s_communication consulting 23 0.70</p>
<p>FACTOR B (9 sorts)</p> <p>sort--load</p> <p>masc_62_c_geo 1 0.48</p> <p>fem_27_c_arquitet 2 0.56</p> <p>masc_44_c_professor 3 0.65</p> <p>fem_56_c_public services 6 0.50</p> <p>masc_55_d_geologist 10 0.46</p>	<p>sort--load</p> <p>fem_54_s_banking service 12 0.67</p> <p>fem_22_s_journalist 19 0.57</p> <p>fem_34_c_house wife 20 0.45</p> <p>fem_35_c_house cleaning 21 0.44</p>
<p>No significant loading (3 sorts)</p> <p>sort</p> <p>fem_39_c_accounting 5</p> <p>fem_35_c_house cleaning 21</p> <p>masc_66_s_professor 30</p>	

Source: the authors.

**Figure 1: Important images**



Source: the authors.

## Results and comments of factor structure

Street mural art near the FIFA stadium in São Paulo asks, in symptomatic form, the following question: “World Cup for whom?” The image works as a master guide for an initial appraisal of the factors. It leads to some of our first observations because it is ranked highest (+4) on the positive pole of Factor A and therefore points the way toward an understanding of three narratives that explain what the 2014 FIFA World Cup means to Brazilians. There are two factors, A and B, with Factor A being bipolar. Multiple responses to the question are given: Factor A+ (11 sorts) is an agonizing justification for asking the question “World Cup for whom?”; Factor A– (07 sorts) chooses to idolize children and the statue of Christ the Redeemer on Corcovado; and Factor B (09 sorts) elaborates a conscious attempt to find some kind of harmony in the conflicting values, trying to find a state of temporary balance. The narratives

that pervade the factors are laden with conflict, even anxiety, as will be illustrated in the following discussion, which is based on diverse theoretical perspectives and explores qualitative and quantitative approaches. In fact, this cross-sectional approach relates different theoretical and methodological perspectives.

According to the factor structure, the scenario envisioned by Factor A was divided between two confrontational but non-exclusive sentiments: the nationalist boosterism of official messages and the popular criticism expressed in the streets. It is interesting to note that in both cases, there are patriotic feelings put into play by almost everyone. Beyond political ideology, wouldn't these different ways of expressing the feeling of patriotism be a matter of affiliation and political decision? Whether one favors holding the World Cup or is against it, each expresses, in their own way, a sense of love of country and a willingness to belong to a wider group. Whether one is a fan of the national team, ignoring any consequences, or one protests holding the World Cup, all are Brazilians who want to be involved with the political-social situation in some way, at least at the symbolic-imaginary level.

Additionally, with this factor structure, it is possible to understand attitudes and opinions of Brazilians in this time-space context and beyond. One can also identify certain patterns of political behavior that have characterized the middle class and young Brazilians in recent decades, evidencing the creation of an ambience of exchange and very high interaction between individuals in the public space. One can appeal, for purposes of theoretical and epistemological discussion, to the possibility of a rapprochement between the concepts of *consciring*, formulated by William Stephenson (1980), and of dialogism by Mikhail Bakhtin (1988): *consciring* is sharable knowledge in a given cultural context, i.e., a mode of knowing with and understanding with someone about a reality that forms through dialogic, interactive processes. *Consciring* is a relational way of knowing reality and communicating something about it. Therefore, it means something communicable and fits perfectly into the theory of verbal interaction put forth by Bakhtin, for whom all communication is an act of social and cultural sharing, in which interpretative models are the stock in trade (Said; Stricklin, 2014).

This is a central point: thoughts, and therefore attitudes, are the result of intersubjective relationships. This theoretical framework makes social interaction directly cogent, and everything in this context is self-referential: "the Q sorts are correlated with one another, bringing past into present and future in the process" (Stephenson, 1987). Communicability is the possibility of self-expression in a specific context of interaction and shared ideas. In Bakhtin, subjectivity is the ultimate expression of the coordinating role of language. It is not

specifically about mere interaction but an interactive context in which the individual fits, models themselves, and ultimately thinks about themselves as a subject. Moreover, this is a context of high complexity, where many agents interact. If there is any possibility of understanding subjective behavior objectively, it is only through the perspective of interaction with others, when we share knowledge (*consciring*). To this, Stephenson gives the name communicability. And this is what Q methodology measures.

### **Factor A (Bipolar, 11 positive and 7 negative loaders)**

On Factor A, there is a fundamental conflict. If we examine the two poles separately, it is clear that the negative pole favors the Cup (integrative), and the positive pole is against the Cup (critical), retaining a rejection of the institutional order as practiced, in a political attitude that does not separate political action and the passion for soccer. When, however, we look at the two poles and connect them, the conflict becomes clear—and will be deepened over time. This ambiguous feeling does not seem to be resolved consciously. The rankings demonstrate a certain anxiety on the part of all co-authors of Factor A. As much as they do not want to mix politics with soccer, this becomes impossible. They strive, therefore, to separate their feelings and attitudes: on one side, passion for soccer; on the other, political criticism. But this division is complicated and sometimes a source of uncertainty. This conflict is in the minds and hearts of the co-authors and is revealed in some of the comments made by participants when performing the Q sort. For example, in the case of Sort #14, a 28-year-old woman, administrator, single, justifying her ranking of items at +4: “the World Cup is nice, but investing in education is even better!”

There is a sense of conflict to be found in many of the sorts. On one hand, they are critical and are disappointed with public policy as practiced and the situation in the country. On the other hand, they cannot avoid patriotic feelings that is elevated by the proximity to the World Cup, especially because of the scope and frequency of advertising campaigns and propaganda of patriotic character. In other words, they are divided between expressing criticism of the government and the situation of the country and cheering passionately for the national team at the World Cup of 2014. This is expressed in the ambivalence of the factor under consideration. For many, this may seem an ambiguous feeling and therefore they turn ambivalent. But a more refined analysis allows one to realize that there is a tension and a dispute between the collective



sense of reality (the actual situation of the country with all its problems) amongst the co-authors of this factor and the collective imagination (images associated with soccer conforming to a feeling of Brazilianess and of belonging to a group) that impregnates the individual feeling.

We can attribute to Factor A+ a feeling of social commentary that is acute in its analytical capacity and in the impact that popular demonstrations provoke in its sense of reality. This critical attitude could be the opposite of cognitive dissonance. This is made clear in the justification given by Sort #7 for the choice of items scored most positively: “they convey a message about the reality of current Brazil on the eve of the Cup.” It is important to note also that the conflict alluded to above is expressed and usually resolved with a cynical response and/or based on humor and comedy. Sort #29, for example, made a joke, using an error in the Portuguese language and writing in a playful way in a comment that underscores his social commentary in a feisty and playful manner (see Bakhtin, 1988, 1997a, 1997b and Stephenson, 1967): “*Brazil, Gol de PRACA (sic) – mais educação.*” This is to say, ironically, “the public protests were like a particularly beautiful score, in favor of more education.”

There is, on the other hand, a surreptitious criticism linking the World Cup to the Brazilian government. The images and discourses of an institutional slant, particularly those that contain an image of President Dilma Rousseff, are always ranked negatively by the positive pole of the factor. The official and institutional propaganda is only ranked positively by Factor A- and similarly ranked positively by Factor B when the message is detached from an image of the President and/or her government.

Thus, the images defending the hosting of the Cup and patriotism associated with the government (images containing Dilma or with a more institutional character) are given little salience and almost always a negative valence, indicating that co-authors of Factor A, even those who are in favor of the realization of the World Cup (the negative pole), adopt a critical stance when it refers to images favoring institutional personalities, favoring the maintenance of social order and the defense of political parties and groups. This is revealing of a new way of engagement and of a political activism that materializes in the conduct of public events, with a ritualistic aspect and a playful character. William Stephenson (1967) had already defended the idea that a ludic environment promotes self-reflection, but also the critique of the existing social order. The streets of Brazil in June 2013 were pure party, ecstatic ritual, the carnivalization of public order (Bakhtin, 1999). The chaos generated by the demonstrations opposed the monotony of institutional speech. There is no evidence of support for public institutions. All items ranked highly by co-authors of Factor A- refer to patriotic sentiments stated in symbols,

leaving aside governmental and institutional appeals, as in the case of Sort #23, who drew a picture of the Brazilian flag and wrote “in 2014, the Cup is green and yellow” to justify the choices made. On the other hand, the crisis of current political leaders (in this case, President Dilma) would produce an empty space that, further ahead, would demand the emergence of new leaders, one of whom would use the country’s symbols in a paroxysmal way.

## **Factor B**

In Factor B, there is a conscious attitude that one can mix criticism of the government and the World Cup with the Brazilian feelings that soccer evokes and still be consistent. The co-authors of Factor B have criticized the state of the nation and government policies, but they love soccer, love the country, and cannot stop cheering for the national team. This perspective consciously and decidedly takes up the proposition that patriotism can seamlessly alternate between passion and criticism, adhesion and dissent. They are those who would try to resolve the conflict in as conciliatory a manner as possible. They are confident that they can be in favor of the World Cup, in favor of Brazil, and at the same time criticize the World Cup and the country. This becomes clear upon examination of the highest-ranked items for this factor: “NOT AGAINST THE TEAM. AGAINST THE CORRUPTION” and “FIFA quality for Schools and Hospitals.” Further, the co-authors of Factor B rated positively (+3) also images which highlight the sporting event and justify the choices consciously made: “the happiness of a people should not be limited to events occurring at four-year intervals, but in the dignity of always providing for their welfare in its fullness” (Sort #3). And again: “I prefer to first look at the positive side of the Cup, the fun, but at the same time, I think it is a bit of a policy of bread and circuses” (Sort #2).

“We don’t want to just have fun. We want dignity, #Copa for whom?” (Sort #19). This is the comment that is most emblematic of Factor B. It expresses a doubt that ripples across the factors of the study and is said to underscore the diversity of the Brazilian population and the social inequalities in the country. It is in this sense that this Q study may lead to interesting reflections about national identity and political divisions, which guided the subsequent political events.

## Final considerations

An interesting datum about the factors of this study is the fact that, when the images defend the World Cup and exalt patriotism, they refer to patriotic symbols (the sun, beaches, monuments, idols, etc.), and they receive positive rankings on the negative pole of Factor A and of Factor B. Additionally, the images ranked as neutral, such as the official logo of the Cup, its mascot, the commemorative coin, and the twelve new stadiums, don't awaken strong positive or negative feelings in any of the factors. These images are more neutral and irrelevant—maybe because they do not reach the imaginary and symbolic levels of patriotic feelings that the World Cup awakens, particularly in a country where soccer is considered an element of national identity.

In the “country of soccer,” this sport invented by the English can integrate feelings, but it cannot unify Brazilians. Brazil is a multicultural and interfaith nation and, even more, a nation composed of diverse social strata. Brazilians assumed different attitudes and opinions with respect to the implementation of the World Cup in Brazil, as seen in this study. In short, it seems that Brazilians can divide but also integrate when it comes to the World Cup. This broad socio-symbolic spectrum is clear if we launch our gaze to the streets of the country, since June 2013, taken by protesters who expressed the most diverse, distinct, and sometimes discordant points of view on the nation's reality. However, a vindication of political citizenship, despite the differing inclinations of identity of the people who protested in the streets, is much more than the sum of unique features and regional differences. Most of the people who went to the streets in every state of the country had similar orientations: they were there to promote social criticism, to protest for some reason, and to accomplish this in a playful, even comical, way. Yet they were demanding better living conditions. The street was turned into a venue for the staging of different actors who would claim a leading role over the next few years, as their connection to the agendas of political parties became more complex.

Much has been speculated about June 2013: the meeting of plural identities; the replacement of indirect representative politics by collaborative action in networks; the moment in which the poor descended from the “*favela*” and the middle class left Facebook; the conjunction of varied spaces (streets and networks) in which different times were present. In fact, the protests sparked a political hiatus and a rush to fill this gap. Until that moment, there was no clear political intention linked to political parties or groups, whether on the right or left. The results of the 2018 presidential elections (55.13% for the right vs. 44.87% for the left) and

2022 (50.9% for the left and 49.10% for the right) confirm the process of political division that was already ongoing and whose paroxysm can be glimpsed in the invasions and depredations of public property in January 2023. What relationship is there between the demands of the 2013 and 2014 protests and the authoritarian and ultra-conservative inclination of the alleged acts of vandalism in 2023? It is no mere coincidence that the factors revealed in the Q Study indicated that, despite criticism of institutional policies, the feeling of patriotism survives, assumed in each group that constitutes the factors under analysis in a distinct and often confusing way. Does this Q Study presume that the research participants were waiting for that feeling to be better conveyed when political disputes at the electoral level began to take shape?

It seems that the analysis of polyphony in the streets crowded with people is symptomatic and revelatory of the apparent political (and communicative) chaos that would soon indicate the political alternatives left to voters: how can we see the link between someone demanding private issues in the streets in 2013 and the political agenda of political parties in the 2018 and 2022 elections and, on the other hand, the 2023 invasions? There is a disjunction and incongruity between many homogenizing and unifying discourses delivered by public institutions and what the multi-faceted groups and individuals want to comprise today—what classical sociology generally referred to as civil society. In every demonstration against the World Cup, personal feelings and individualized demands were publicly shared, and new discourses, polyphonic and dialogical, emerged. These are results of the interactions between different people in the augmented public space of the street and of social networks. A discussion of such matters can lead to many theoretical speculations: individualism, collectivism, collective crisis, new forms of sociability and group cohesion, tribalization, a crisis of indirect policy models, and representativeness. On the other hand, there is a demonstration of how individual people are formed through and with interactions and relationships with their fellows. This intersubjective game contains semiotic interactions that occur in common and are situated among social actors, just as Bakhtin (1988, 1997a, 1997b, 1999) proposed with his theory of sign action, and Stephenson (1980) with his concept of conscurring, which signifies cultural awareness built in participatory and interactive ways. Combining diverse methodological approaches, a Q Study argues that the analysis of subjectivity depends on correlations among numerous subjects. The results can be understood as a possibility among the many possible contexts in which interpersonal communication occurs in unpredictable ways within some singular political and cultural contexts.

Regarding this Q Study, despite regional peculiarities, it can be said that (a) some believe they need not wear the Brazilian team jersey to be patriots (radical critics), but they cannot avoid the emotion that soccer arouses; (b) others wear the jersey, cheer for the team, but are critical of the direction of public policy (realistic critics who love soccer); (c) some do not see a problem in rooting for Brazil, because they only want to think about the importance that soccer has in their lives and in the social integration that the Cup might make possible.

In all of them, however, the patriotic sentiment sometimes reveals, albeit in different modulations, a religious appeal. The 2018 presidential campaign is a good example of how the symbolic spectrum conferred to the protests had already been insinuated in the advertisements of the government of Dilma Rousseff after June 2013. In that institutional counter-offensive, images of a religious nature presupposed a single meaning: the existence of God corresponds with the image of Brazil as a fortunate land. As a result, the salvationist discourse of a religious nature during the 2018 election fostered a form of group cohesion with refinements of fanaticism, proclaiming the burial of parties and the end of political history. Needless to say, the result was the election of the conservative Jair Bolsonaro.

To be sure, these reflections can point to important elements that explain Brazilian political tendencies and can also contribute to understanding some of the political decisions and policies that took place after the protests of June 2013.

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